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I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal law contains few areas more difficult than the subjects of
lesser included offenses and instructing down-the study of which offenses
can be convicted of on the basis of a given charge under the evidence in a
given case. During the last decade, Missouri law has appeared particularly
confused on this topic. This Article attempts to point out the sources of this
confusion and offer solutions. The theories developed will be compared
with the General Assembly's recent major revision of the Missouri homicide
scheme.
Although Missouri's homicide scheme underwent little change from its
initial development in 1835 until the major revisions in 1975, it always has
presented difficulties. This was not due to weaknesses of that first non-com-
mon law murder format, but to case-by-case demands for justice. For the
most part, though, the homicide scheme worked well. It consisted of first
degree murder, second degree murder, and manslaughter.'
In the early 1970's, two separate forces significantly altered the struc-
ture and operation of the homicide scheme. The first of these was a 1975
statutory change in the definitions of the homicides prompted by the
United States Supreme Court's invalidation of certain death penalty stat-
utes.2 In an attempt to design a constitutionally viable system, the Missouri
legislature enacted a scheme consisting of capital murder, first degree mur-
der, second degree murder, and manslaughter. 3 This hierarchy presented
internal problems not present in the old system. Missouri's new criminal
code, effective in 1979, did not change the homicide statutes, but sections of
it affected the homicide scheme and produced additional problems.4
1. The statutes will be discussed in section II infra. The old homicide statutes
were Mo. REv. STAT. § 559.010 (1969) (first degree murder) (repealed); id.
§ 559.020 (second degree murder) (repealed); id § 559.070 (manslaughter) (re-
pealed).
2. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1971); note 17 infra.
3. The statutes were Mo. REV. STAT. § 559.005 (Supp. 1975) (capital mur-
der) (repealed); id § 559.007 (first degree murder) (repealed). Second degree mur-
der and manslaughter stayed the same. Those statutes defined the homicides as
they existed prior to the 1983 revisions. See id § 565.001 (1978) (capital murder); i.
§ 565.003 (first degree murder); id § 565.008 (second degree murder); id § 565.005
(Supp. 1982) (manslaughter).
4. Compare Mo. REv. STAT. § 556.046 (1978) (defines lesser included offenses)
with id. § 556.031 (what Code sections apply to non-Code offenses). The designa-
tion "non-Code offense" indicates that the offense was not enacted as part of the
new criminal code, effective January 1979. The present homicides were enacted in
1977 and therefore are non-Code offenses. Section 556.046 has produced significant
problems. See Part IV infra.
[Vol. 48
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The second change came with the Missouri Supreme Court's promul-
gation of mandatory jury instructions for criminal cases: the Missouri Ap-
proved Instructions-Criminal (MAI-CR). As originally adopted in 1974,
the MAI-CR mirrored current homicide law, but the court soon thereafter
made changes to the law of homicides and expanded upon these changes in
MAI-CR. In State v. Stapleton,' for example, the court abolished Missouri's
presumption of murder and instituted in MAI-CR the automatic submis-
sion rule for manslaughter and second degree murder. Expanding on this
rule, the court also promulgated MAI-CR's justified by the evidence test for
instructing down in situations not governed by the automatic submission
rule.
6
Through these changes, the court dictated that homicide cases should
be treated differently than non-homicide cases in instructing down. 7 Staple-
ton and MAI-CR allowed a jury to arbitrarily choose between homicides
rather than convict of the highest offense supported by the evidence.
8
The court has encountered difficulties with the 1975 statutory homi-
cide scheme. Old ideas unsuitable for application in the new system and
new but inappropriate positions are now being tried in an attempt to obtain
a grasp on this area of the law. The 1979 Criminal Code redefined the
relationship of the homicides, because the code contains a new section gov-
erning lesser included offenses.9 Homicides as substantive offenses, how-
ever, have remained the same since 1975.
The purpose of this Article is to review and analyze the Missouri homi-
cide scheme as an operating model. First, it looks at the operative charac-
teristics of each present homicide as a substantive offense. Second, the
mental culpability required for each homicide is examined. The third sec-
tion deals with lesser included offenses and instructing down and tests the
theories of MAI-CR on the homicides. Finally, recent Missouri homicide
legislation is studied and compared to the existing scheme.
II. THE HOMICIDES AS SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSES
A. Capital Murder
The only Missouri homicide punishable by death is capital murder.
5. 518 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).
6. The automatic submission rule is the ultimate posture of the justified by
the evidence test. See Mo. APPROVED INSTR.-CRIM. No. 15.00.3(d) (2d ed. 1979);
id. No. 15.00.3 caveat c.
7. Id No. 15.00.3(b) ("justified by the evidence" test).
8. See State v. Martin, 602 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
9. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.046 (1978); see also State v. Baker, 636 S.W.2d
902 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (held first degree murder is not a lesser included offense of
capital murder and distinguished § 556.046 from its predecessors, Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 556.220-.230 (1969) (repealed) in defining lesser included offenses), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 834 (1983).
1983]
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Missouri Revised Statutes section 565.001 '0 provides that "[a]ny person
who unlawfully, willfully, knowingly, deliberately, and with premeditation
kills or causes the killing of another human being is guilty of the offense of
capital murder." The elements were drawn from the pre-1975 first degree
murder statute, except that the word "knowingly' was added."
B. First Degree Murder
The second most grievous Missouri homicide is first degree murder.
This homicide deserves study because of its felony-murder roots and its sig-
nificant alternations in 1975. The pre-1975 first degree murder statute had
changed little since it was first enacted over one hundred years ago:
Every murder which shall be committed by means of poison, or by
lying in wait, or by any kind of willful, deliberate and premedi-
tated killing, and every homicide which shall be committed in the
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery,
burglaIy or mayhem, shall be deemed guilty of murder in the first
degree.
This statute contained the basic elements of present capital and first degree
murder. Although first degree murder constituted only one homicide, there
were two basic methods of proving the required mental state. In "common
form" or "conventional" first degree murder, deliberation and premedita-
tion could be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the killing.' 3 By
contrast, in first degree felony-murder,"4 proof of commission of one of the
felonies listed in the statute could also show the accused's state of mind.' 5
Missouri followed the majority position on applying the felony-murder rule:
proof of the felony was required, but the felony was not an element of the
murder. 16
In 1975, Missouri adopted a new first degree murder statute designed
10. (1978).
11. Capital murder will not be discussed in detail because the issues will be
covered in the context of the other homicides.
12. Mo. REv. STAT. § 559.010 (1969) (repealed). The previous statute was vir-
tually identical. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 1, at 167 (1835) (first degree murder for
enumerated felony murders and willful, deliberate, and premeditated killings).
Prior to 1835, the statutory definition required only malice aforethought. See id.
§ 4, at 282 (1825). At common law, murder occurred when "a person of sound
memory and discretion unlawfully killeth any reasonable creature, in being and
under the King's peace, with malice aforethought." E. COKE, 3 INsT. 47 (1694).
13. See State v. Lindsey, 507 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. 1974) (en banc); State v. Foster,
61 Mo. 549, 554 (1876).
14. See generaly W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 71, at 545 (1972).
15. See, e.g., State v. Ford, 495 S.W.2d 408, 417 (Mo. 1973) (en banc); State v.
Meyers, 99 Mo. 107, 113, 12 S.W. 516, 517 (1889).
16. See, e.g., State v. Jewell, 473 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Mo. 1971); State v. Bobbitt,
215 Mo. 10, 33, 114 S.W. 511, 517 (1908).
[Vol. 48
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to withstand constitutional scrutiny.' 7 The legislature split first degree
murder into capital murder and first degree murder. The first degree mur-
der statute, which is still in effect, provides:
Any person who unlawfully kills another human being without a
premeditated intent to cause the death of a particular individual
is guilty of the offense of first degree murder if the killing was
committed in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate
arson, rape, robbery, burglary or kidnapping. 18
This statute has been called a first degree felony-murder statute because it
does not require proof of a specific mental state, nor does the felony stand in
lieu of a specific mental state.' 9 The practical distinction between present
first degree murder and old first degree murder is that the specific mental
states have been removed from the statute and the phrase "without a pre-
meditated intent to cause the death of a particular individual" has been
added.
This phrase has some intriguing facets. On one hand, it reveals the
felony-murder fiction of intent to kill more clearly than the previous first
degree murder statute. The mental state and the felonies formerly were
juxtaposed, but now there is no specific mental state with which the felony's
commission is equated. At the same time, the phrase cuts against the opera-
tion of the felony-murder rule, which imputes to a defendant the requisite
mental state for the murder involved. The statute, however, seems to say
that a person lacking the requisite mental state for murder, premeditation,
is guilty of first degree murder solely because the killing occurs during the
attempt or commission of a designated felony.
2 0
Almost all of the law applicable to the felony-murder aspect of the old
first degree murder statute has been carried over to the current first degree
17. For a history of the Missouri homicide statutes in relation to Supreme
Court decisions holding some death penalty laws unconstitutional, see UNIVERSITY
OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA, THE NEw MISSOURI CRIMINAL CODE: MANUAL FOR
COURT RELATED PERSONNEL § 10.3 comment (1978) [hereinafter cited as
MANUAL].
18. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.003 (1978). The mental state elements from old first
degree murder have been carried over to the capital murder statute. See State v.
Handley, 585 S.W.2d 458, 461-62 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (examines effect of altera-
tion and compares first degree murder statute to its predecessor), overruled, State v.
Wilkerson, 616 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. 1981).
19. See Handle,, 585 S.W.2d at 459.
20. The problem with this statute is that "without a premeditated intent" is
inconsistent with the other terms of art used to describe culpable mental states for
the homicides. The Missouri Supreme Court treats the phrase as not describing an
element of the offense. See MISSOURI App. INSTR.-CRIM. No. 15.04 note 3 (2d ed.
1979). Thus, one could have a premeditated intent to kill and still be guilty of first
degree murder. The phrase also creates the anomaly of second degree murder pos-
sessing a higher requisite mental state than first degree murder. See State v. Baker,
636 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Mo. 1982) (en banc); part III infra.
19831
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murder statute. For example, proof of the attempt or commission of one of
the listed felonies still shows the requisite mental state for first degree mur-
der.2 An accused need not have intended the killing but must have in-
tended to commit the felony.22 Moreover, first degree murder can involve
an unintentional killing because of the strict liability nature of the felony-
murder rule.2 3 The Missouri Supreme Court has held that the first degree
murder statute clearly indicates a purpose to dispense with any culpable
mental state requirement for the killing itself 2 4 The enumerated felony
involved in the homicide now becomes an element of first degree murder for
purposes of double jeopardy25 as well as for the substantive definition of the
crime.26 The felony is no longer merely a method of proving the requisite
mental state.27 This is the correct result, dictated by the fact that the stat-
ute no longer requires a finding of a specified mental state but does require
a finding of one of the enumerated felonies as a basis for conviction.
C. Second Degree Murder
The second degree murder statute has remained unchanged since first
enacted in 1835. Missouri Revised Statutes section 565.004 describes sec-
ond degree murder: "All other kinds of murder at common law, not herein
declared to be manslaughter or justifiable or excusable homicide, shall be
deemed murder in the second degree." 28 Although the statute speaks of all
"other kinds of murder at common law," no degrees of murder existed at
common law. The statute refers to other kinds of murders because the defi-
21. See, e.g., State v. Mahaney, 625 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Mo. 1981) (en banc).
22. State v. Newman, 605 S.W.2d 781, 786 (Mo. 1980).
23. See State v. O'Neal, 618 S.W.2d 31, 38 (Mo. 1981).
24. Id A culpable mental state is not required if "the statute defining the of-
fense clearly indicates a purpose to dispense with the requirement of any culpable
mental state as to a specific element of that offense." Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.026
(1978). Id § 562.021.2 dictates when a culpable mental state is to be read into the
definition of an offense. The court views the underlying felony intent as proving the
intent necessary for first degree murder. See State v. Mahaney, 625 S.W.2d 112, 115
(Mo. 1982) (en banc). Mahan seems to keep alive the concept that intent to kill is
proven, while OWeal states that no intent is required.
25. See State v. Lane, 629 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1982) (en banc); State v. Mahaney,
625 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. 1982) (en banc); cf. State v. Chambers, 524 S.W.2d 826, 829
(Mo. 1975) (en banc) (underlying felony in Mo. REV. STAT. § 559.101 (1969) was
not an element of the offense for purposes of double jeopardy), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1058 (1976), overruled, State v. Morgan, 592 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. 1980).
26. See State v. Baker, 636 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 834 (1983).
27. Compare the second degree murder statute, Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.004
(1978), which arguably contains a true felony murder, with the first degree murder
statute, § 565.003, which requires the felony as an element.
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nitions of capital murder and first degree murder do not include all the
types of common law murder.
29
Courts have held that the elements of second degree murder include a
willful, premeditated killing of a human being with malice aforethought.30
As with pre-1975 first degree murder, the mental state can be proven by
two methods. In "common form" or "conventional" second degree murder,
the facts and circumstances of the killing can provide the factual basis for
finding malice aforethought and premeditation. 3 1 In second degree felony-
murder, the commission of a felony not listed in the first degree murder
statute is used merely as an evidentiary substitute for proving the requisite
state of mind from all the facts and circumstances of the case.
32
Although the statutory definition of second degree murder has been
the same since 1835, the Missouri Supreme Court recently has been viewing
it in a different light. For example, it has been held that the underlying
felony in second degree felony-murder is a lesser included offense of the
homicide for purposes of double jeopardy.3 3 Proof of the felony thus is no
longer merely a method of proving the requisite mental state.34 Recently,
the supreme court held that the felony in second degree felony-murder is an
element of the offense.3 5 Another new proposition was articulated in State v.
Mansfxld,36 where the court stated that a defendant charged with conven-
tional second degree murder was not put on notice that the State intended
to show the requisite mental state by proving commission of a felony.3 7 Al-
29. If capital murder, homicides committed in the perpetration of the five enu-
merated felonies (first degree murder), manslaughter, and excusable and justifiable
homicides are set aside, remaining kinds of murder at common law include: inten-
tional murder, non-deliberate, and homicides committed in the perpetration or at-
tempt of a non-enumerated felony. See State v. Chambers, 524 S.W.2d 826 (Mo.
1975) (en banc); MISSOURI App. INSTR.-CRIM. No. 15.16 note 3 (2d ed. 1979).
30. See State v. Mannon, 637 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (citing
State v. Franco, 554 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Mo. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 957
(1977)).
31. State v. Powell, 630 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Black,
611 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
32. See State v. Chambers, 524 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Mo. 1975) (en banc), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1058 (1976), overruled in part, State v. Morgan, 592 S.W.2d 796, 801
(Mo. 1980) (en banc).
33. See State v. Morgan, 592 S.W.2d 796, 803 (Mo. 1980) (en banc); see also
State v. Olds, 603 S.W.2d 501, 510 (Mo. 1980) (en banc).
34. See State v. Chambers, 524 S.W.2d 826, 829-30 (Mo. 1975).
35. State v. Clark, No. 63484 (Mo. August 31, 1982). Clark was decided by
Division I of the court, withdrawn, and transferred to the court en banc on Novem-
ber 16, 1982. The court held that the felony in second degree felony-murder is not
an element of the offense. State v. Clark, 652 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Mo. 1983). The
opinion acknowledged a draft of this Article. Id at 128 n.5.
36. 637 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
37. Id at 703. See also State v. Handley, 585 S.W.2d 458, 459 (Mo. 1979) (plu-
rality opinion) (issue was whether a charge of first degree felony-murder put the
1983]
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though this proposition is clearly dictum, it may lead to the erroneous belief
that these two forms of second degree murder are two different homicide
categories.
3 8
The Missouri Supreme Court's view of the relationship between second
degree felony-murder and double jeopardy needs reexamination. As shown
by State v. Morgan, 39 the court believes that second degree felony-murder is
still not a true felony-murder homicide.40 Like the old first degree felony-
murder, present second degree felony-murder does not include the felony as
an element. Although first degree murder now has a felony as one of its
elements because the legislature has mandated it, there has been no
equivalent alteration of second degree murder.
D. Manslaughter
Manslaughter is the least serious homicide in the Missouri scheme.
Missouri Revised Statutes section 565.005 provides that "[e]very killing of a
human being by the act, procurement or culpable negligence of another,
not declared by law to be murder or excusable or justifiable homicide, or
vehicular manslaughter, shall be deemed manslaughter."4 1 This statute has
remained almost unchanged since 1919.42 Quite simply, manslaughter is a
killing without malice and premeditation that is neither justifiable nor ex-
cusable.4 3 For present purposes, there are three basic types of manslaugh-
ter. First is voluntary manslaughter, which is an intentional homicide that
but for proof of adequate provocation would be murder.44 Second is invol-
defendant on notice that he could be convicted of conventional second degree mur-
der),ovetrled in part, State v. Wilkerson, 616 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Mo. 1981) (en banc).
38. Conventional or felony second degree murder arguably qualify as lesser
included offenses of each other under Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.046.1 (1978) because
second degree murder has only one substantive definition.
39. 592 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. 1980) (en bane).
40. Id at 799. Morgan relied on Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977). Har-
ris is not on point because it involved a felony-murder statute which had a felony as
an element of the murder, and a trial for the underlying felony after the defendant
had been convicted for the felony-murder. Id at 682-83. For a discussion of double
jeopardy, see Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reftections on Government Ap-
peals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001 (1980); Westen & Drubel, Toward a
General Theoiy of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 81.
41. (Supp. 1982).
42. In 1982, the legislature added the phrase "or vehicular manslaughter."
Other than that, the statute is the same as it was in 1919. See Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 3236 (1919). Until 1909, manslaughter was divided into degrees. See id §§ 4454-
4468 (1909) (repealed). Section 4468 (fourth degree manslaughter) was similar to
§ 565.005. The 1919 revision abolished common law manslaughter. State v. Gore,
292 Mo. 173, 178, 237 S.W. 993, 997 (1922).
43. State v. Sturdivan, 497 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Mo. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam).
44. See, e.g., State v. Ayers, 470 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Mo. 1971) (en bane); State v.
Clough, 327 Mo. 700, 705, 38 S.W.2d 36, 39 (1931).
[Vol. 48
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untary manslaughter, an unintended killing which results from an inten-
tional non-felonious act. This is commonly called misdemeanor-
manslaughter.4 5 Finally, there is culpable negligence manslaughter, which
occurs when the actor shows a careless or reckless disregard for human life
or limb.4 6 This Article focuses on voluntary manslaughter.
Manslaughter's past in Missouri has been problematic.4 7 At common
law, murder could be reduced to manslaughter only if there was adequate
provocation, the killing occurred during the heat of passion, and there was
a causal connection between the provocation, the passion, and the fatal
act.4 8 In 1919, the legislature removed the heat of passion requirement
from the statute.49 This was held to do away with common law manslaugh-
ter. Yet over the next five decades, Missouri courts appeared confused as to
whether common law manslaughter still existed. 0
From 1969 to 1975, the law underwent significant changes.5 1 By the
end of 1975, the Missouri Supreme Court had decided that no concrete
distinction existed between manslaughter and murder, that the defendant's
mental state was a question of fact for the jury, and that no evidence of
provocation was required before manslaughter could be submitted to a
jury.52 Manslaughter law has remained unchanged since then.
III. REQUISITE MENTAL STATES
The fact pattern of almost every killing constitutes, in the abstract, a
prima facie case for a punishable homicide. A murder committed during a
45. See State v. Frazier, 339 Mo. 966, 976, 98 S.W.2d 707, 713 (1936).
46. See, e.g., State v. Cutshall, 430 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Mo. 1969); State v. Stude-
baker, 334 Mo. 471, 477, 66 S.W.2d 877, 879 (1933).
47. See Hunvald, Criminal Law in Missouri-Manslaughter, A Problem of Defnition,
27 Mo. L. REv. 1,passim (1962).
48. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 53 (1969). Generally, only physical vio-
lence to the actor, catching a spouse in adultery, or acting in defense of home or
property mitigated common law murder to common law manslaughter.
49. State v. Gore, 292 Mo. 173, 187-88, 237 S.W. 993, 997 (1922).
50. See, e.g., State v. Haynes, 329 S.W.2d 640, 645-46 (Mo. 1959) (assumed that
common law provocation is necessary to reduce murder to manslaughter).
51. See State v. Williams, 442 S.W.2d 61, 64 (Mo. 1969) (en banc) (Missouri no
longer has common law manslaughter so only proof of facts tending to negate the
malice and premeditation required to reduce murder to manslaughter). In State v.
Ayers, 470 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. 1971) (en banc), the court overruled Williams to the
extent it required "proof of facts," and stated that manslaughter should be in-
structed upon unless no evidence in the record could cause a juror to doubt whether
the defendant had the requisite mental state for murder. Id at 538. See also State v.
Stapleton, 518 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Mo. 1975) (en banc) (under Ayers, submissible
second degree murder case requires that manslaughter also be submitted to the
jury).
52. See State v. Stapleton, 518 S.W.2d 292, 299 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).
1983]
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burglary, for example, is first degree murder.5 3 The State need only prove a
causal connection between the burglary and the killing. Further, any mur-
der committed with a deadly weapon by injury to a vital part of the body
will be presumed to be second degree murder. A murder committed during
the attempt or commission of a felony not listed in the first degree statute is
also second degree murder.5 4 A killing which results from a lawful, inten-
tional, non-felonious act is misdemeanor-manslaughter.
55
The factual variables within each of these examples may be numerous.
If a homicide is committed, there is likely a specific mental culpability
which will, under the law, flow from the facts. Once the fact pattern is
shown, the State can rely on it to show that the defendant had the necessary
culpability. This is not true, however, for homicides in which the State
must argue the requisite mental state from the facts and circumstances of
the case. An example of this is capital murder, where the requisite mental
culpability must be argued to and found by the jury. There is no support-
ing fact pattern which presumptively illustrates the requisite mental state
for capital murder. The principle just articulated is not difficult, but it is
basic to comprehending the operation of the homicide scheme.
Second degree murder is the pivotal homicide because an inference of
at least second degree murder arises from almost every killing. For exam-
ple, killing by intentionally using a deadly weapon on a vital part of the
body raises a presumption of malice that will support a finding of piemedi-
tation and malice.5 Premeditation means that the actor has thought of the
act for any length of time before acting.57 Malice aforethought is the un-
53. E.g., State v. O'Neal, 618 S.W.2d 31, 38 (Mo. 1981).
54. See State v. Chambers, 524 S.W.2d 826, 832 (Mo. 1975) (en banc), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1058 (1976),overruled, State v. Morgan, 592 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. 1980).
55. See State v. Frazier, 339 Mo. 964, 979, 98 S.W.2d 707, 714-15 (1936).
56. E.g., State v. Black, 611 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). The com-
mon law rule originated to aid prosecutors. See Oberer, The Deadly Weapon Doe-
trine-Common Law Origin, 75 HARV. L. Rev. 1565, 1567 (1972); Comment, The
Evolving Use of Presumptions in the Criminal Law: Sandstrom v. Montana, 41 OHIO ST.
LJ. 1445 (1980). In Missouri, the presumption of murder is better classified as an
inference or a permissible presumption because it is not conclusive as to the inten-
tional act. Cf. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517 (1979) (jury instructed
that the accused was presumed to have intended the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary acts but not that presumption was rebuttable). Missouri's presumption
or inference of second degree murder from a deadly weapon homicide requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the act causing the death was intentional. See
State v. McKinzie, 102 Mo. 620, 628, 15 S.W. 149, 150 (1890); State v. Black, 611
S.W.2d 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). "The law presumes malice as a concomitant of a
shooting with a dangerous and deadly weapon . . . ; but the element of intent
remains a question for the jury and the law raises no presumption about it." State
v. Bolden, 494 S.W.2d 61, 65 (Mo. 1973) (citations omitted).
57. State v. Strickland, 609 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Mo. 1980); State v. Weiners, 66
Mo. 13, 25 (1877); State v. Powell, 630 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). At
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lawful intention to take life, which intention precedes the killing.
5 8
On a given set of facts, there are two avenues from an inference of
second degree murder: (1) up to first degree murder and capital murder, or
(2) down to manslaughter. The path to first degree murder, however, is not
really "up" in the sense of additional required mental elements. Current
first degree murder requires only proof of an unlawful killing and the at-
tempt or commission of an enumerated felony. Under the old first degree
murder statute, conventional first degree murder would have required addi-
tional mental culpability, and first degree felony-murder would have pre-
sumed the mental state from the underlying felony.5 9 This may not be so
under the present statute.' Thus, capital murder is the next step up from
second degree murder with respect to the required mental state. By defini-
tion, capital murder differs from second degree murder in that it specifically
requires, in addition to premeditation, that an unlawful killing be commit-
ted willfully, knowingly, and deliberately. It is the finding of deliberation
which elevates a homicide from second degree to capital murder.6 ' To de-
liberate on a killing means to take "another's life in a cool state of blood or
with a cool and deliberate state of mind.",
62
The other avenue from a submissible case of second degree murder is
down to manslaughter. Since manslaughter is the killing of another which
is not murder, or justifiable or excusable homicide, once a prima facie case
of second degree murder is made, there must be some evidence to support a
one time it was reversible error to omit the term "beforehand" from the jury in-
struction. See State v. Harris, 76 Mo. 361, 363 (1882).
58. State v. Weiners, 66 Mo. 13,21 (1877). See also State v. Powell, 630 S.W.2d
168, 172 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
59. See State v. Jewell, 473 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Mo. 1971).
60. See State v. Baker, 636 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (mental state
required for second degree murder is higher than that of first degree murder), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 834 (1983). Committing a felony listed in Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.003 (1978) arguably assigns to a defendant the mental state of malice afore-
thought since that was what the felony-murder rule did at common law. See State
v. Curtis, 70 Mo. 594, 598 (1879).
61. To convict of capital murder, the jury is required to find that the accused
intentionally took the victim's life, knew the act was practically certain to cause the
victim's death, and that the accused reflected upon taking the victim's life coolly
and fully before doing so. See State v. Morris, 639 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Mo. 1982) (en
banc), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1438 (1983). "Willful" is equivalent to "intentional,"
and "knowingly" is equivalent to "intentionally" and "willfully." State v. Holmes,
609 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Mo. 1980) (en banc). "Deliberation" was the distinction be-
tween pre-1975 first and second degree murder. See State v. Hyster, 504 S.W.2d 90,
93 (Mo. 1974); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 559.010-.020 (1969) (repealed).
62. State v. Morris, 639 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 1438 (1983). See State v. Greathouse, 627 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Mo. 1982); State
v. Wood, 596 S.W.2d 394, 401 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 876 (1980);
State v. Howell, 543 S.W.2d 836, 841 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
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finding that the defendant lacked the requisite malice.6" Thus, the distinc-
tion between second degree murder and manslaughter is malice and pre-
meditation. 4 This is not to say that manslaughter cannot be intentional, it
is just that provocation can negate the existence of malice.65 Intentional
63. See State v. Ayers, 470 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Mo. 1971) (en banc); State v.
Clough, 327 Mo. 700, 705, 38 S.W.2d 36, 38 (1931).
64. See State v. Sturdivan, 497 S.W.2d 139, 143 (Mo. 1973). It is not clear
whether "malice and premeditation," "malice aforethought," or even "malice"
alone legitimately distinguish second degree murder from manslaughter. These
terms have not been kept separate. See, e.g., State v. Curtis, 70 Mo. 594, 598 (1879)
(equated "aforethought" with "premeditation"). Missouri's definition of second
degree murder would seem to include malice aforethought and premeditation.
Other states use premeditation as a term for a mental state other than that in-
volved in common law murder. See, e.g., Parks v. State, 333 So. 2d 906, 911 (Ala.
Crim. App.) (second degree murder is "the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice, but without deliberation or premeditation"), cert. denied, 333 So. 2d 912
(Ala. 1976); State v. Barrett, 130 Vt. 97, 99, 290 A.2d 14, 15 (1972) (second degree
murder involves malice but not premeditation). The distinction in Missouri be-
tween "malice" and "malice aforethought" could not be more clouded. The Mis-
souri Supreme Court has traditionally defined the two differently. See, e.g., State v.
Weiners, 66 Mo. 13, 20-21 (1877) (one can commit manslaughter with malice by
intentionally doing the wrongful act without just cause or excuse, but murder re-
quires malice aforethought). It is well settled that manslaughter can be committed
intentionally. In State v. Gadwood, 342 Mo. 466, 116 S.W.2d 42 (1937), the appel-
lant contested an instruction which allowed the jury to convict him of manslaughter
if they found he had intentionally killed the victim, but without malice and without
premeditation. He argued that the definition of malice made such an instruction
contradictory. In affirming the conviction, the court stated:
Malice is the essential ingredient of murder; to be manslaughter the kill-
ing must be without malice. Yet the common law and the statute law of
this State have always recognized that a homicide may be manslaughter
though intentional, as where one kills another in a transport of passion
aroused by "adequate" "lawful" or "reasonable" provocation. State v. El-
lis, 74 Mo. 207, 215; State v. Edwards, 70 Mo. 480, 483. The doctrine is a
concession to human frailty and proceeds on the theory that the malice is
submerged or purged by the provocation. Nevertheless through all the
years this court has defined malice in homicide cases as "a wrongful act
done intentionally without just cause or excuse." Judge Scott said in State
v. Schoenwald, 31 Mo. 147, 157, that is the best definition of malice to be
met with in the books. . . . [M]alice is a general malignancy of purpose
"which prompts a person to intentionally take the life of another without
just cause, justification, or excuse, an signifies a state of dispostion that
shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief."
State v. Young, 314 Mo. 612, 630, 286 S.W.2d 29, 34.
Id at 494-95, 116 S.W.2d at 58. It is best to heed that manslaughter is a killing
without malice. The best contemporary definition of malice is in State v. Lay, 427
S.W.2d 394, 400 (Mo. 1968).
65. See State v. Gadwood, 342 Mo. 466, 116 S.W.2d 42 (1937); State v. Hostet-
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(voluntary) manslaughter is an offense reduced from a prima facie case of
murder.
66
The Missouri Supreme Court has contributed to the notion that any
killing is a manslaughter. This position is incorrect, and with the enact-
ment of the new criminal code, it appears that the mental state for man-
slaughter cannot slip below recklessness.67 The issue is deciding when the
evidence warrants submitting jury instructions for a lesser included offense.
This discussion of the interrelationship of the Missouri homicides is in-
tended to provide a conceptual framework upon which the next part of this
inquiry-lesser included offenses and instructing down-builds. The oper-
ating model just examined is not the same as the one the Missouri Supreme
Court put in its Missouri Approved Instructions-Criminal. The distinction
between the two is examined in the next part of this Article.
IV. LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES AND INSTRUCTING DOWN
One of the most difficult aspects of homicide law is correctly determin-
ing which homicide should be submitted to a jury as a lesser included of-
fense of another. This involves determining: (1) whether a homicide, as a
matter of substantive law, is defined as a lesser included offense of another,
and (2) whether the evidence will support submission.
A. Theoretical Underpinnings of Instructing Down
Instructing down is not new; it was employed at common law and
early Missouri cases deal with it.6" It strives to permit the jury to determine
the facts when evidence of the highest offense is weak or contradictory. At
ter, 222 S.W. 750, 755 (Mo. 1920). This is true under the common law, see State v.
Taylor, 309 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1958), and under the less rigid rule of State v. Ayers,
470 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. 1971) (en banc).
66. See R. PERKINS, supra note 48, at 51 (1969) (manslaughter is a "catch all");
cf State v. Stapleton, 518 S.W.2d 292, 300 (Mo. 1975) (en banc); Mo. APPROVED
INSTR.-Crim. No. 15.18 (2d ed. 1979); id No. 15.00.3 note 3.
67. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.021.2 (1978) (if offense does not expressly pre-
scribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state is required and is established
only if a person acts purposely, knowingly, or recklessly). In State v. Mannon, 637
S.W.2d 674, 677 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), the court interpreted § 556.031.2 as making
§ 562.021.2 applicable to second degree murder. But see MANUAL, supra note 17,
§ 1.7 comment (1978). Mannon found that second degree murder expressly provided
otherwise on the issue of its requisite mental state. Mo. APPROVED INSTR.-Crim
No. 15.20 (2d ed. 1979) (culpable negligence manslaughter) requires that the jury
find the defendant acted with "reckless disregard for human life and safety."
"Recklessly" is defined in id. No. 33.01, the same as in Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.016.4
(1978). The reckless mental state requirement seems to be consistent with long-
standing Missouri law on what constitutes culpable negligence for statutory man-
slaughter. See State v. Watson, 216 Mo. 420, 432, 115 S.W. 1011, 1015 (1909).
68. See, e.g., State v. Shoemaker, 7 Mo. 177, 179 (Mo. 1841); Watson v. State, 5
Mo. 497, 499 (1838).
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common law, a jury could find a defendant guilty of any lesser offense nec-
essarily included in the offense charged.69 The rule originated to aid the
prosecution when the evidence failed to establish an element of the crime
charged.7" The accused sees the practice as a two-edged sword; it allows
conviction of a crime less serious than that charged, but it also makes con-
viction of some crime more certain.
The function of the jury must be considered when discussing the sub-
ject of instructing down. The jury acts on society's behalf to judge the acts
of a peer and to see that proper punishment is imposed. Members of the
jury may acquit the defendant, but they cannot return a verdict on a lesser
included offense not supported by the evidence. 7 The jury's duty is to find
the accused guilty of the highest offense supported by the evidence.72 If the
jury did not have such an obligation, a defendant could receive a more
lenient punishment than society has deemed appropriate for a crime. Arbi-
trariness in the results of two factually identical cases could also result.
The jury does not have carte blanche to decide what crime a defendant
should be convicted of. This is illustrated in the evidentiary test that deter-
mines when to submit instructions to the jury on lesser offenses. The objec-
tive is to channel the jury's fact-finding duty so that it may not arbitrarily
choose an offense. Most jurisdictions have held that before an instruction
on a lesser included offense is warranted, the evidence must provide a basis
for acquittal of the greater offense and conviction of the lesser.73 The fed-
69. See I J. CHITrY, CRIMINAL LAW 250 (5th Am. ed. 1847); 2 W. HAWKINS,
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 236 (6th ed. 1787).
70. 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 515 n.2
(1982).
71. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895); Westen, supra note 40, at
1012. It may seem inconsistent to say that in an undisputed prima facie murder
case the jury can completely disbelieve the state's case and acquit, but that they
cannot disbelieve only a part of the state's case and convict of a lesser offense of the
offense charged. See Comment, Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses, 57 Nw.
U.L. REV. 62, 66-67 (1962). The goal is to channel the jury to convict a defendant
of the highest crime supported by the evidence. If undisputed evidence is put on for
the higher crime and the jury does not believe it, then they do not believe the
defendant is guilty. If, however, the evidence is conflicting or weak as to an element
of the greater offense, then there is reason in the record to disbelieve that element.
Otherwise, the jury would be unilaterally commuting punishment.
72. See, e.g., State v. Hacker, 214 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Mo. 1948) (proper for court
to tell the jury that consideration of lower grade of an offense depends upon their
failure to be convinced of a higher grade).
73. See 5 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 545 (12th ed. 1974); 40 AM.
JUR. 2dHomicide § 529 (1968);see, e.g., Chavers v. State, 361 So. 2d 1106, 1107 (Ala.
1978); People v. Glenn, 200 Colo. 416, 423, 615 P. 2d 700, 705 (1980); Common-
wealth v. Santo, 375 Mass. 299, 305, 376 N.E.2d 866, 867 (1978); State v. Hill, 614
S.W.2d 744, 750 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); People v. Scarborough, 49 N.Y.2d 364, 368,
402 N.E.2d 1127, 1129, 426 N.Y.S.2d 224, 226 (1980); Alger v. State, 603 P.2d 1154,
1155 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979); State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723, 729, 259 S.E.2d 120,
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eral rule is the same."4 The United States Supreme Court recently held
that such an evidentiary restraint on instructing down is permissible even in
death penalty cases. 5
The relationship between instructing down and the function of the
jury is seen in several black-letter rules of law. A defendant may have
grounds for appeal if. the evidence supported the submission of a lesser
included offense instruction but the instruction was not given, 76 the defend-
ant is convicted of an offense which was not a lesser included of the offense
charged,77 or if he is convicted of a lesser included offense not supported by
the evidence.78 No error exists if the defendant is convicted of a necessarily
lesser included offense when the evidence supported conviction of a greater
offense.7 '9 The same is true if the evidence did not support submission of the
lesser included offense and the instruction was not given.
80
There are constitutional restraints on instructing down. As under com-
mon law, a defendant must have notice of the crimes for which he may be
convicted on the basis of the crime charged. He cannot be convicted of a
crime not specifically charged in the information or indictment unless it is a
lesser included offense.8 ' Notice always was supplied at common law be-
125 (1979); State v. Oien, 302 N.E.2d 807, 809 (S.D. 1981); State v. Bower, 28
Wash. App. 704, 709, 626 P.2d 39, 42 (1981); Hawthorne v. State, 99 Wis. 2d 673,
682, 299 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Wis. 1981). This "acquit of the greater, convict of the
lesser view" is shared by the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(5)
comment (Tentative Draft No. 5 1956).
74. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973); Sparf v. United
States, 156 U.S. 51, 53 (1895). The rule has been called the "independent evidence
test" because it requires evidence which supports acquittal of the greater offense
and conviction of the lesser. See Comment, supra note 71, at 65.
75. Hopper v. Evans, 102 S. Ct. 2049 (1982) (defendant's testimony negated
any possibility that he was guilty of a lesser degree of the crime charged). See also
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
76. E.g., State v. Parker, 324 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Mo. 1959); State v. Shoemaker,
7 Mo. 177, 180 (1841).
77. E.g., Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937); State v. Elliott, 559
S.W.2d 175, 177 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); State v. Brannon, 55 Mo. 63, 65 (1874).
78. E.g., State v. Wilson, 88 Mo. 13, 16 (1885).
79. See, e.g., State v. Millard, 242 S.W. 923, 927 (1922) (although defendant
was convicted of first degree murder as charged, conviction of the lesser offense
instructed upon would not have been prejudicial). Surely this assumes that there is
sufficient evidence of the lesser offense. See, e.g., State v. Richardson, 364 S.W.2d
552, 554 (Mo. 1963); Hunvald, supra note 47, at 20. But see State v. Murphy, 341
Mo. 1229, 1238, 111 S.W.2d 132, 137 (1937) (defendant convicted of second degree
murder where evidence supported conviction of first degree murder or acquittal).
80. See State v. Kaufman, 335 Mo. 611, 73 S.W.2d 217 (1934) (jury properly
instructed on first degree felony-murder and not on manslaughter); State v. Hayes,
247 S.W. 165, 168 (Mo. 1922) (manslaughter instruction properly refused where
evidence showed only that defendant provoked victim).
81. State v. Billingsley, 465 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Mo. 1971). See also State v. Wil-
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cause proper lesser included offenses were those necessarily included in the
commission of the offense charged. Problems of notice arise when legisla-
tures designate lesser degrees of an offense as lesser included offenses even
though the elements are not necessarily included in the greater offense.
Missouri passed such a law in 1835.82
B. Lesser Included Offenses and Instructing Down in Misouri
If there is not a good deal of confusion about the law of instructing
down in Missouri, there is at least quite a bit of disagreement. This section
will examine the statutes governing this area and the applicable MAI-CR
jury instructions. Although the statutes do not completely control, they will
be studied first because they contain the pre-MAI-CR position. MAI-CR
then will be examined in order to see the current state of the law. Finally,
the theories of MAI-CR will be tested to see whether they are sound.
kerson, 616 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. 1981) (en banc); State v. Smith, 592 S.W.2d 165 (Mo.
1979) (en banc); State v. Shoemaker, 7 Mo. 177 (1841).
82. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 14, at 214 (1835). Defendants have long argued that
this statute precluded conviction for an offense that was not specified as a lower
degree of the offense charged even though the offense qualified as a necessarily in-
cluded lesser offense. See, e.g., Watson v. State, 5 Mo. 497, 499 (1839) (defendant
convicted of manslaughter on first degree murder charge). But see State v. Shoe-
maker, 7 Mo. 177, 180 (1841) (statute not intended to supercede common law lesser
included offenses principles); Watson v. State, 5 Mo. 497, 498 (1839) (same). The
court later held that the statute could not allow convictions prohibited at common
law; a proper lesser degree included offense also had to be a necessarily included
lesser offense. See, e.g., State v. Brannon, 55 Mo. 63, 65 (1874); State v. Shoemaker,
7 Mo. 177, 180 (1841). This situation does not appear to have affected the homi-
cides because under the hierarchy they were necessarily included lesser offenses of
one another. But see State v. Handley, 585 S.W.2d 458 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (ap-
plied pre-1879 view to the relationship between first degree murder and second
degree murder), overruled in part, State v. Wilkerson, 616 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. 1981) (en
banc). Compare the dictum in State v. Wilkerson, 616 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Mo. 1981)
(en banc), to the effect that prior to the enactment of Mo. REv. STAT. § 1655
(1879) (allowed conviction of offense necessarily included in the charged offense),
the only proper lesser included offense was one specifically denominated as a lesser
degree of the crime charged, regardless of whether it was necessarily included in the
offense charged. This dictum appears to be erroneous; the 1835 statute was not
intended to preclude operation of the common law. If the Wikerson dictum was
correct, manslaughter would not have been a proper lesser included offense of mur-
der. The 1879 enactment of § 1655 must have been the legislature's attempt to
counteract the court's restrictive interpretation of § 14 in non-homicide cases. Such
legislation is commonly employed to permit conviction of cognate offenses or allied
offenses of the same nature. See Comment, supra note 71, at 62. Wilkerson appears
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1. Duty to Instruct Down
The trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on lesser included of-
fenses. Missouri Revised Statutes section 546.070.483 governs the order of
trial in criminal cases: "Whether requested or not, the court must instruct
the jury in writing upon all questions of law arising in the case which are
necessary for their information in giving their verdict." 84  This statute has
been interpreted to impose upon the trial court a duty to instruct on lesser
included offenses,8 5 but only when evidence in the record would support
conviction of the lesser offense and acquittal of the greater.
8 6
2. Substantive Definitions of Lesser Included Offenses
Prior to the 1979 Criminal Code, the statues permitted a defendant to
be convicted of an offense which was "inferior in degree"8 7 and "necessarily
included" in the offense charged. 8 In retrospect, determining what pre-
1975 homicides were lesser included offenses of the charged offense looks
83. (1978).
84. In 1879, Mo. REV. STAT. § 1908 (1879) (presently § 546.070) was new.
The Act of Mar. 20, 1901, ch. 16, 1901 Mo. LAWS 140, added the phrase "whether
requested or not." Prior to 1879, the duty was imposed by the common law. See
Hardy v. State, 7 Mo. 607, 609 (1842) (duty to instruct on all the law arising in the
case); see also MO. SuP. CT. R. 28.02(a). In State v. Olson, 636 S.W.2d 318 (Mo.
1982) (en banc) the court held that an instruction on a lesser included offense in a
non-homicide case must be requested before a legitimate point of error can be
raised. The court distinguished homicide offenses from non-homicide offenses, ap-
plying the requested or not rule only to the former. Id at 322. The new Missouri
homicide legislation, discussed in Part V infra., has removed the requested or not
language.
85. See State v Gotthardt, 540 S.W.2d 62, 66 (Mo. 1976) (en banc); State v.
Tilley, 569 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
86. See State v. Howard, 564 S.W.2d 71, 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (non-homi-
cide); see also State v. Wilson, 88 Mo. 13, 16 (1885) (homicide case which applied
the rule but did not cite the statute).
87. Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.220 (1969) (repealed) provided:
Upon indictment for any offense consisting of different degrees, as
prescribed by this law, the jury may find the accused not guilty of the
offense charged in the indictment, and may find him guilty of any degree of
such offense inferior to that charged in the indictment, or of any attempt to
commit such offense, or any degree thereof; and any person found guilty
of murder in the second degree, or of any degree of manslaughter, shall be
punished according to the verdict of the jury, although the evidence in the
case shows him to be guilty of a higher degree of homicide.
(emphasis added).
88. Id. § 556.230 provided:
Upon an indictment for an assault with intent to commit a felony, or
for a felonious assault, the defendant may be convicted of a lesser offense;
and in all other cases, whether prosecuted by indictment or information, the
jury or court trying the case may find the defendant not guilty of the
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straightforward. 9 All lower homicides were included within the homicide
charged in the indictment because of the structure of the homicide
scheme.' Second degree murder was an offense inferior in degree to first
degree murder because it was designated as second degree murder and it
was a less grievous murder than first degree murder.9 1 Manslaughter was
an offense inferior in degree to both first and second degree murder because
it was the least grievous punishable homicide.
92
The inferior in degree test still worked well with the 1975 change in the
homicide scheme. First degree murder was an offense inferior to capital
murder.93 Second degree murder was an offense inferior to both capital
and first degree murder.94 Manslaughter was an offense inferior to capital
murder,95 first degree murder,96 and second degree murder.9 7 Difficulties
existed, however, with the necessarily included test as between first degree
and second degree murder because the requisite mental state of the latter
was actually higher than that required for the former.9 8 Second degree
murder was necessarily included in capital murder, and manslaughter was
necessarily included in all the higher homicides.
offense as charged, and find him guilty of any offense, the commission of which
ir necessarily included in that charged against him.
(emphasis added).
89. See, e.g., State v. Wilkerson, 616 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Mo. 1981) (en banc)
(explaining operation of §§ 556.220-.230).
90. First degree murder charges necessarily included second degree murder
(even though felony-murder was involved), State v. Jewell, 473 S.W.2d 734, 739
(Mo. 1971), manslaughter, State v. Kelton, 299 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Mo. 1957), and
every degree of criminal homicide. State v. Rollins, 226 Mo. 524, 534, 126 S.W.
473, 481 (1910) (citing the predecessor of § 556.220).
91. See State v. Rollins, 226 Mo. 524, 126 S.W.473 (1910).
92. See State v. Kelton, 299 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1957) (citing former § 556.220);
see also Watson v. State, 5 Mo. 497, 500 (1838).
93. State v. Wilkerson, 616 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Mo. 1981) (en banc). Cf. State v.
Handley, 585 S.W.2d 458 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (plurality) (overruled Wilkerson to
the extent it held that conventional second degree murder was not a lesser included
offense of first degree murder).
94. State v. Wilkerson, 616 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. 1981) (en banc).
95. The same result should apply here as between old first degree murder and
manslaughter because capital murder has the same specified mental culpability as
old first degree murder. See State v. Kelton, 299 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1957).
96. See State v. Flenoid, 617 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1981).
97. The 1975 revision did not change second degree murder or manslaughter.
98. State v. Handley, 585 S.W.2d 458 (Mo. 1979) (en banc), relied on Mo.
REv. STAT. § 556.230 (1969) (repealed) as stating that a valid lesser included of-
fense could only be an offense necessarily included in the offense charged. The
opinion overlooked id § 566.220 (repealed), which stated that a defendant could be
convicted of an offense inferior in degree to the offense charged. See also State v.
Wilkerson, 616 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Mo. 1981) (en banc) (statute gives sufficient notice
to afford due process).
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Under section 556.046 of the Criminal Code of 1979, 9 there are three
ways an offense becomes a lesser included offense; this Article will discuss
two of them. First, an offense can be an "elements lesser," ie., an offense
established by the same or less than all the facts necessary to establish the
charged offense."° Second, an offense can be specifically denominated by
statute as a lesser included offense."' Here, lesser degrees of a crime be-
come lesser included offenses because they are specifically denominated by
statute as such, regardless of how the elements differ from those in the
greater offense.1"2 This kind of lesser offense shall be termed a "specifically
denominated lesser."
10 3
Whether an offense is a lesser included offense of another is a matter of
substantive law. If a crime includes a lesser offense, it will include the lesser
offense in all cases. If the lesser offense cannot be submitted to the jury in a
particular case, it will be due to the lack of evidentiary support, not because
the offense is not a lesser included offense.104
3. Statutory Test for Instructing Down
Once an offense is determined to be a lesser included offense of the
99. Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.046 (1978) (replacing former §§ 556.220-.230). This
statute has been interpreted to require instructing down unless there is no evidence
to acquit of the greater offense and convict of the lower. See State v. Olson, 636
S.W.2d 318, 321 (Mo. 1982) (en banc); State v. Hill, 614 S.W.2d 744 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981). Section 556.046 contains two statements concerning the substantive law of
lesser included offenses: in subsection 1, it defines lesser included offenses by setting
out three tests, and in subsection 2 it defines the right to instructions on the lesser
included offenses submitted. The statute does not mandate instruction on all lesser
included offenses. The source of that duty is § 546.070.
100. See State v. Smith, 592 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Mo. 1979) (en banc); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 556.046.1(1) (1978).
101. Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.046.1(2) (1978).
102. See State v. Wilkerson, 616 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Mo. 1981) (en banc) (first and
second degree murder).
103. Compare the specifically denominated test with the broader inferior degree
test in Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.220 (1969) (repealed) and its predecessors. See State
v. Baker, 636 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). The specifically denominated
lesser test focuses on the name of the crime. If it is not a second, third, or fourth
degree of the charged crime, then it would not qualify as a lesser included offense.
The inferior in degree test, however, was flexible enough to allow an examination of
the substantive nature of the offenses involved. See, e.g., State v. Watson, 5 Mo. 497,
500 (1838) (manslaughter a homicide inferior in degree to homicide of first degree
murder). If the inferior in degree test was in § 556.046, there would be no problem
with the present homicides being lesser included offenses of one another. Had
§ 556.046 been in effect with the pre-1975 homicide scheme, the homicides would
still have qualified as lesser included offenses of one another.
104. This is a common stumbling block. It is imperative to separate the substan-
tive definition of an offense as the lesser included offense of another and the ques-
tion of whether the evidence in a given case supports it.
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crime charged, another step must be taken before the determination can be
made to submit the offense to the jury. There must be evidence in the
record to support submission of the offense. Although Missouri Revised
Statutes section 556.046.2105 may substantively define a crime as a lesser
included offense, the jury will not necessarily always be instructed on the
lesser offense.
Section 556.046.2 codifies a rule that Missouri courts have applied to
both homicide and non-homicide cases.10 6 The jury may not disbelieve un-
disputed evidence on a factual element of the state's case; there must be an
evidentiary basis to disregard the evidence of the higher offense.'° 7 Hence,
the statement that under the evidence the accused was either guilty of the
offense charged or guilty or no offense.108
Even a true "elements lesser" offense is not necessarily submitted to the
jury. If a submissible case is made for the charged offense and all the facts
or elements of the lesser offense have been proven, the jury cannot disbe-
105. (1978).
106. See State v. Craig, 433 S.W.2d 811 (Mo. 1968) (en banc) (evidence estab-
lished first degree robbery by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon and defend-
ant was either guilty of the offense charged or no offense).
107. See, e.g., State v. Norris, 365 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Mo. 1963). Although Craig
was not a homicide case, this rule was applied to homicide cases. See, e.g., State v.
Ford, 495 S.W.2d 408, 417 (Mo. 1973) (en banc) (defendant either guilty of first
degree murder or not guilty); State v. King, 433 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Mo. 1968) ("evi-
dence points [only] to a killing by one lying in wait, the distinguishing element of
murder in the first degree . . . [and] court was not required to instruct on second
degree murder"); cf. State v. Hyster, 504 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Mo. 1974) (in first degree
murder conviction for murder by strangulation, error not to submit second degree
murder and manslaughter instructions because evidence would support them).
Hyster is consistent with Ford and King. The factual element of the felony in felony-
murder produced the rule expounded in Ford and King. The murder in Iyster was
one for which the jury could properly determine more than one mental state due to
its being a non-felony-murder. Compare State v. Sturdivan, 497 S.W.2d 139 (Mo.
1973) (conventional first degree murder by strangulation case where neither second
degree murder nor manslaughter were instructed upon).
108. See, e.g., State v. Benjamin, 309 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Mo. 1958). "Substantial
evidence" defines whether the jury could have properly found a fact from the evi-
dence. See City of Kan. City v. Oxley, 579 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
In instructing down, the test is whether there is any evidence which would allow the
jury to disbelieve an element of the greater offense and whether there is evidence
which would support conviction of the lesser offense. When a court states that there
was no need to instruct down because evidence of the greater offense was "strong
and substantial," e.g., State v. Craig, 433 S.W.2d 811 (Mo. 1968) (en banc), it
should not be taken for granted that the proper test was applied. For example, in
State v. McCall, 602 S.W.2d 702, 707 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), the substantial evidence
test was used to determine whether second degree murder should be submitted in a
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lieve the evidence of the greater offense without some evidence to cast doubt
upon it." 9 Applying this evidentiary test to a specifically denominated
lesser offense is more easily done because it is obvious that some specifically
denominated lessers possess elements different from those in the greater of-
fense."' 0 Thus, proving the greater offense does not provide a submissible
case for the lesser.
Whether the evidentiary test of section 556.046.2 applies to homicides
has been questioned by dictum in State v. Olson. "' The test does not pres-
ently apply to homicides. A contrary indication, however, is found in a
statute that deals with applying the Code to offenses committed before and
after its enactment and to non-Code offenses. Missouri Revised Statutes
section 556.031.2112 provides:
Offenses defined outside of this code and not repealed shall
remain in effect, but unless otherwise expressly provided or unless
the context otherwise requires, the provisions of this code shall
govern the construction of any such offenses committed after Jan-
uary 1, 1979, as well as the construction and application of any
defense to a prosecution for such offenses.
Consistent with this statute, section 556.046 has been held to govern the
substantive definition of lesser included offenses for homicides occurring af-
ter January 1, 1979.113 Given that the evidentiary test in section 556.046
applied to homicides long before it was codified there, and given that the
homicide statutes contain no indication that the test should not apply to the
homicide offenses, it appears that the legislature intended the test to
apply. 114
109. State v. Benjamin, 309 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1958); State v. Ford, 495 S.W.2d
408 (Mo. 1973) (en banc).
110. See, e.g., State v. Wilkerson, 616 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. 1981) (en banc).
111. 637 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). The MAI-CR position is that al-
though § 556.046 applies to such non-Code offenses as murder, it should not affect
the automatic submission rule with regard to the lesser offense of manslaughter.
The rule is based on the definition of manslaughter, and the application of Code
provisions to non-Code offenses is controlled by the statute defining the non-Code
offense. MANUAL, supra note 17, § 1.10 comment. The court's apparent contradic-
tion is its misstep regarding the law of manslaughter. That misconception will be
discussed in Part IV infia. Other than where the automatic submission rule oper-
ates, the acquit/convict test is purportedly allowed to do so. As shall be seen in
Part IV this is simply not true. The justified by the evidence test in MAI -CR oper-
ates where the automatic submission rule does not, thus making the only question
whether a submissible case of a particular homicide has been made.
112. (1978).
113. See State v. Baker, 636 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). Section
556.046 is substantive and does not govern the definition of lesser included offenses
for crimes committed prior to January 1, 1979. See Baker, 636 S.W.2d at 904; see also
MANUAL, supra note 17, § 1.7 comment.
114. MAI -CR mandates that the traditional evidentiary test does not apply
to homicides. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(5) (1956), from which
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C. Applying Section 556. 046 to the Homicides
1. Capital Murder
First degree murder cannot qualify under section 556.046 as a lesser
included offense of capital murder. First, it is not an elements lesser because
it requires an element-a felony-which capital murder does not.1 15 Sec-
ond, it is not a specifically denominated lesser of capital murder.
1 1 6
Second degree murder, whether conventional or felony-murder, satis-
fies the elements test since all the elements of second degree murder are
included in the elements of capital murder.11 7 The evidentiary test always
would be met in a solely capital murder-second degree murder case because
the only real distinction between the two is "deliberation." Deliberation is
truly a mental element of capital murder and thus, on the same set of undis-
puted facts, a jury could properly find this element or not find it. Use of a
felony to help prove the mental state for capital murder could obviate any
difficulty in deciding whether an instruction on second degree felony-mur-
der should be submitted to the jury. Obviously it would if the proper felony
were involved. On its statutory elements, however, there is no doubt that
second degree murder is defined as a lesser included offense of capital
murder.
Manslaughter is also an elements lesser of capital murder because it is
a killing that is neither murder nor excusable or justifiable homicide.
Under the evidentiary test, however, a manslaughter instruction would be
proper only when some evidence existed which could cast doubt in a juror's
mind as to the accused's deliberation, premeditation, and malice. This can
be done through almost any evidence of passion, excitement, or rage that
could produce reasonable doubt as to the existence of malice and premedi-
tation. Moreover, any evidence that could show that the killing resulted
from the defendant's culpable negligence would warrant an instruction on
§ 556.046.2 is copied. The Model Penal Code evidentiary test applies to homicide
and non-homicide cases because if the acquit/convict test is not employed, a jury
could easily reach the wrong result by arbitrarily choosing the crime of which the
defendant is guilty. Id § 1.08(5) comment. Section 556.046.2 should apply to
homicides because nothing expressly provides otherwise and the context does not
otherwise require it, as provided in § 556.031.2.
115. See State v. Baker, 636 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). Butsee State
v. Daugherty, 631 S.W.2d 637 (Mo. 1982) (first degree murder can be submitted as
a lesser included offense of capital murder); State v. Furh, 626 S.W.2d 379 (Mo.
1982) (same).
116. See State v. Wilkerson, 616 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Mo. 1981) (en banc) (first and
second degree murder).
117. The only distinction is that deliberation is required for capital murder.
This is based on the view that the felony in second degree murder is not an element
of the crime. Compare this with the court's position that the felony causes double
jeopardy to operate. See Part II supra.
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2. First Degree Murder
Conventional second degree murder is a specifically denominated
lesser of first degree murder. 19 It is not an elements lesser because it re-
quires premeditation and malice aforethought while first degree murder
does not. 120 Second degree felony-murder might never be submitted to the
jury as a lesser included offense of first degree murder because the felonies
involved are mutually exclusive. This does not mean that second degree
felony-murder requires a felony not enumerated in first degree murder, but
only that the felony patterns for these two homicides do not overlap. When
the felony for second degree felony-murder is a lesser included offense of the
felony for first degree murder and the evidence supports submission of the
lesser, 12 ' the two could be given in the same case.
Manslaughter is substantively defined as an elements lesser of first de-
gree murder because it is a killing which is neither murder nor excusable or
justifiable homicide. It is difficult, or uncommon, to satisfy the evidentiary
test to get to manslaughter from first degree murder. Some evidence con-
tradicting the attempt or commission of the felony should be required
before the jury is permitted to disbelieve that factual element and choose
manslaughter. As a practical matter, however, if such evidence is present, a
second degree murder submission likely will be available, creating a situa-
tion where doubt-inducing evidence as to mental state must be in the rec-
ord to escape a second degree murder conviction. As a matter of course, a
prima facie case for first degree murder probably will not provide eviden-
tiary support for a manslaughter instruction due to the nature of that
higher offense.'
22
3. Second Degree Murder
Manslaughter is an elements lesser of second degree murder because it
involves a killing which is neither murder nor excusable or justifiable homi-
cide. As discussed in an earlier section, there must be some doubt-inducing
evidence in the record regarding mental culpability before the evidentiary
test in the statute will be met. If second degree felony-murder is involved,
the same problems arise as for first degree murder.
118. According to MAI-CR, culpable negligence manslaughter is not a lesser
included offense of any other crime. Mo. APPROVED INSTR.-CRIM. No. 15.20 note
5 (2d ed. 1979).
119. State v. Wilkerson, 616 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Mo. 1981) (en banc).
120. See State v. Baker, 636 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. 1982) (en banc); see also Part II
supra.
121. This should involve the acquit/convict test on the felony enumerated in the
first degree murder statute. Even the MAI -CR should concur with this because a
non-homicide is involved.
122. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 602 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
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Second degree felony-murder is arguably an elements lesser of conven-
tional second degree murder because it is proved by the same facts. 123 The
converse is also true. This does not make either a less grievous homicide
than the other. A charge of either offense should put a defendant on notice
of the other.
D. Lesser Included Offenses and Instructing Down According to MAI-CR
The Missouri Supreme Court does not follow section 556.046 in decid-
ing what is a lesser included offense and when to instruct down.'2 4 Since
1974, the court has promulgated mandatory pattern jury instructions for
criminal cases-the MAI-CR. The notes and caveats to the instructions
contain many specific directives on instructing down. 125 These comments
at least imply what homicides are less included offenses of each other. The
court's operating theories in MAI-CR blur the distinction between the sub-
stantive definition of an offense and the determination of whether the evi-
dence in a given case supports its submission to the jury.
1. MAI-CR's Justified by the Evidence Test
The MAI-CR 15.00126 evidentiary test for instructing down is one of
whether a submissible case has been made for the lesser included offense.
The test requires that "[i]n homicide cases, as in all others, all lesser in-
cluded offenses justified by the evidence must be submitted along with the
highest grade of a homicide submitted."'12 7 "Justified by the evidence" as
uged here "means that all essential elements of the offense may be found or
inferred from the evidence."'12  Under this test, an elements lesser of the
charged offense would always be properly submitted to the jury when its
greater offense was submitted, even though the evidence of the greater of-
fense was undisputed.129 The court's endorsement of this statement led it to
123. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.046.1(2) (1978); cf. State v. Mansfield, 637
S.W.2d 699, 704 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
124. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 28.02(a), however, follows § 546.020(4) insofar as that
statute required the trial court to instruct the jury whether requested or not.
125. See Mo. APPROVED INSTR.-CRIM. No. 15.00.3 caveat c (2d ed. 1979).
126. (2d ed. 1979).
127. Mo. APPROVED INSTR.-CRIM. No. 15.00.3(b) (2d ed. 1979).
128. Id
129. The court intended that homicides be governed by this rule rather than the
traditional acquit/convict rule. See id No. 17.00 note 5. The note regards the sub-
mission of lesser included offenses in non-homicide cases and specifically states that
it does not cover the submission of lesser included offenses in homicides. Id No.
15.00.3. "Justified by the evidence" is common parlance for instructing down in
accordance with the traditional evidentiary test. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 245
S.W.2d 866, 868 (Mo. 1952). "Supported by the evidence" in Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.006.1 (Supp. 1979) (dealing with capital murder cases) is not the same as that
in MAI-CR. To so interpret it would be to give it a contradictory meaning to the
instructing down test in Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.046.2 (1978). There is no need to
[Vol. 48
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create "the automatic submission" rule for second degree murder and man-
slaughter. The court requires that: (1) an instruction on manslaughter
must be given when any higher homicide offense is submitted, and (2) a
conventional second degree murder instruction must be given in all cases in
which the court instructs on capital murder. 130 In these two cases, submis-




2. Lesser Included Offenses
The Missouri Supreme Court takes the position that, with the excep-
tion of culpable negligence manslaughter, a given homicide is a lesser in-
cluded offense of any higher homicide. 132 For our purposes, the most
have a different test for capital murder cases. See Hopper v. Evans, 102 S.Ct. 2049,
2052 (1982); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980). The recent change
in § 565.006.1 proves the legislature's desire to do away with the need to have the
jury consider capital murder, first degree murder, second degree murder, and man-
slaughter. This indicates an intent to employ the traditional evidentiary test rather
than automatically submit every homicide to the jury in a capital murder case.
130. This automatic submission rule originally applied only to second degree
murder and manslaughter in any non-felony-murder case. See Mo. APPROVED IN-
STR.-CRIM. No. 6.02 caveat d (1974). In first degree felony-murder cases, second
degree murder and manslaughter were submitted only if the evidence would sup-
port it. See id caveat a. If a first degree felony-murder case also supported a second
degree murder instruction, manslaughter was automatically submitted under the
second degree murder instruction. Id The automatic submission rule was ex-
panded in a 1975 revision of the first MAI-CR homicide series. Mo. APPROVED
INSTR.-CRIM. No. 6.02 note 4(c)(2) (1975). The rule remained unchanged except
that manslaughter was to be automatically submitted in every greater homicide
case, including felony-murders. The court articulated that this change was due to
the nature of manslaughter but did not include culpable negligence manslaughter.
Id
131. Mo. APPROVED INSTR.-CRIM. No. 15.00.3 caveat c (2d ed. 1979). The
court stated that no felony-murder homicide is automatically submissible, but if
any lesser included offense instruction is justified by the evidence, it is of no conse-
quence that the charge or submission of the higher offense was of conventional or
felony-murder.
132. When manslaughter is submitted as a lesser included offense of any greater
homicide, it is conventional manslaughter, not culpable negligence manslaughter.
Id caveat 1. If capital murder is the highest offense submitted, then second degree
murder (conventional) and manslaughter (voluntary) must also be submitted. I1d
No. 15.00.3(d). First degree murder and second degree felony-murder must also be
given in such a case if they are justified by the evidence. State v. Daugherty, 631
S.W.2d 637, 645 (Mo. 1982); State v. Fuhr, 626 S.W.2d 379, 379 (Mo. 1982); Mo.
APPROVED INSTR.-CRIM. No. 15.00.3(d) (2d ed. 1979). If first degree murder is the
highest offense submitted, then voluntary manslaughter must be submitted. State
v. Flenoid, 617 S.W.2d 75, 75 (Mo. 1981); Mo. APPROVED INSTR.-GRIM. No.
15.00.3(e) (2d ed. 1979). If justified by the evidence, instructions on second degree
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important aspect of this position is that voluntary manslaughter is present
in every higher homicide.
The court has modified MAI-CR since it became effective in 1979. In
State v. Baker, 133 the court held that first degree murder cannot pass either
test in section 556.046 to become a lesser included offense of capital murder.
The notes for the MAI-CR 15.00134 series thus were overruled to the extent
that they allowed first degree murder to be instructed upon under a capital
murder charge. Although conventional second degree murder is undoubt-
edly a lesser included offense of capital murder, the court has recently cast
doubt on its position that second degree felony-murder is a lesser included
offense thereof.'
31
E. Comparing MAI-CR with the Traditional View
The real differences between MAI-CR and the traditional position in
Missouri homicide law are: (1) the evidentiary test for instructing down,
and (2) the substantive definition of manslaughter. 3 ' The scheme resulting
from these two changes allows instructing down to almost any lesser homi-
cide in any case and requires that voluntary manslaughter always be sub-
mitted as a lesser homicide. The theory of this system is that the jury is
always free to determine, as a question of fact, the culpability of the defend-
ant.'3 7 Dissatisfaction with this scheme has been growing. It has been de-
scribed as implementing a "new policy of giving the jury in a homicide case
the unfettered right to commute punishment for an offense committed and
to impose the punishment it finds proper."' 38 It is difficult to determine the
murder (conventional and felony-murder) must be submitted. State v. Donovan,
631 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Mo. 1982) (both conventional second degree murder and second
degree felony-murder are lesser included offenses of first degree murder); Mo. AP-
PROVED INSTR.-CRIM. No. 15.00.3(e) (2d ed. 1979). If conventional second degree
murder is the highest offense submitted, the court must instruct on conventional
manslaughter. Id No. 15.00.3(). See State v. Stapleton, 518 S.W.2d 292, 300 (Mo.
1975) (en banc). If the evidence justifies, a second degree felony-murder instruction
must be given. Mo. APPROVED INSTR.-CRIM. No. 15.00.3(0 (2d ed. 1979). If sec-
ond degree murder felony is the highest offense, a conventional manslaughter in-
struction must be given. Id No. 15.00.3(g).
133. 636 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
134. See Mo. APP. INST.-CRIM. Nos. 15.00-15.56 notes (2d ed. 1979).
135. See State v. Clark, 652 S.W.2d 123 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (felony is not an
element of second degree felony-murder and second degree felony-murder is a lesser
included offense of capital murder) (citing a draft of this Article).
136. A non-MAI-CR manslaughter is a murder fact pattern which is deter-
mined to not be murder, due to adequate evidence of provocation, while the MAI -
CR requires no evidence of provocation.
137. See, e.g., State v. Olson, 636 S.W.2d 318, 321-22 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (com-
pares jury's prerogative in homicide and non-homicide cases).
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relationship between the justified by the evidence concept and the changed
substantive definition of manslaughter. Without the latter, however, the
former could not operate as it does.
1. Operation of the MAI-CR Justified by the Evidence Test
The Missouri Supreme Court has mandated that all homicides justi-
fied by the evidence should be submitted to the jury. 139 Under the court's
evidence test, an elements lesser offense would always be submitted because
proof of the greater offense alone places in the record evidence sufficient to
support submission of the lesser. The test presents a new and unique rule
for instructing down in homicide cases."4 It rejects the traditional view
that there must be some evidence in the record to create doubt about an
element of the greater offense before instructing on the lesser offense. The
traditional position recognized that the facts of a homicide could bear legal
significance to a particular mental state of the defendant.
The distinction between the traditional theory and the court's rule is
illustrated by dividing homicides into two groups: "presumptive degree"
and "facts and circumstances." Presumptive degree homicides exist when
the proof of the fact pattern will, by its legal significance, prove the mental
139. Mo. APPROVED INSTR.-CRIM. No. 15.00.3(b) (2d ed. 1979) provides that
justified by the evidence means that all the essential elements of the offense may be
found or inferred from the evidence. This test applies to all homicides, including
felony-murder. In MAI-CR (First), the acquit/convict test originally hung on in
first degree felony-murder cases for instructing down to second degree murder and
manslaughter. Mo. APPROVED INSTR.-CRIM. No. 6.02 caveat a (1975). See also
State v. Moore, 580 S.W.2d 747 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (murder committed July 28,
1975); Fulsom v. State, 625 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (1974 murder convic-
tion); Mo. APPROVED INST.-CRIM. No. 6.02 notes and caveats (1974). Id No.
15.00.3(b) (the justified by the evidence test) is in a setting where manslaughter is
always submissible. The Court has recently stated that the non-homicide ac-
quit/convict test does not apply to homicides. Id No. 17.00.5. In State v. Olson,
636 S.W.2d 318, 322 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), the court stated that the acquit/convict
test does not operate in any murder cases. The only two homicides between which
the justified by the evidence test operates are present first degree murder and second
degree murder. In all other situations, the automatic submission rule operates
and/or the acquit/convict rule would be satisfied anyway.
140. The court's prima facie gloss on this phrase apparently stems from the
capital murder scheme; the court believed that in a capital murder case every lesser
homicide justified by the evidence had to be submitted. If the evidence supports a
finding of the elements of a particular homicide, then it is justified by the evidence.
The automatic submission rule is the ultimate posture of the justified by the evi-
dence test. Automatic submission homicides are, by definiton, always justified by
the evidence. The court views the homicides as differing only in mental state the
way that capital murder differs from second degree murder. Missouri is isolated in
this view; almost every jurisdiction uses the traditional acquit/convict test for in-
structing down. See note 73 supra.
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state. 14 1 For example, a deadly weapon homicide will contain all the ele-
ments sufficient for the jury to convict of second degree murder. 142 Felony-
murders also are presumptive degree homicides. The mental state of almost
every homicide will be proven by showing its fact pattern because either
statute or case law recognizes a particular mental culpability as flowing
from those facts. Accordingly, to obtain an instruction on a lesser included
offense of a presumptive degree homicide, i.e., to escape the presumption,
there must be some evidence to allow the jury to disbelieve some operative
factual element of the state's case.
Facts and circumstances homicides require the State to convince the
jury that the facts add up to a particular culpable mental state. This allows
the jury to properly reach more than one decision as to mental state even
without contradictory evidence as to the higher homicide. 143 A good exam-
ple is the distinction between capital murder and second degree murder
when only these two homicides are considered. The issue is whether the
element of deliberation is present."4 Deliberation is a mental state for
which there is no substitute factual element. Capital murder is a true facts
and circumstances homicide because it is for the jury to decide whether the
defendant had the requisite deliberation for capital murder, or whether he
was lacking deliberation and is guilty only of second degree murder. The
justified by the evidence test transformed the Missouri homicide system into
one having only facts and circumstances homicides-on one set of facts, a
jury is allowed to choose any one of the homicides.
The automatic submission rule, which applies to second degree murder
and manslaughter, is the ultimate posture of the justified by the evidence
test. It requires great reliance on the substantive definition of the offense
because it is in essence saying that there is always evidence warranting sub-
mission of a particular lesser included offense.
Under the traditional view, an automatic submission rule could oper-
ate between capital murder and second degree murder, but only when first
degree murder is not considered.' 4 5 If the case involves only capital murder
141. "Presumptive" is used merely for convenience; it is not intended to mean
that a murder has presumptively been committed, but that if a murder is found to
have been committed, it is presumptively of a certain degree.
142. See State v. Black, 611 S.W.2d 236, 239-40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
143. A facts and circumstances homicide, although charged in the indictment or
information as the highest offense, requires that the prosecutor convince the jury to
reach up from a presumptive degree homicide and find the distinguishing mental
state between them.
144. This relationship is the same as the permissible inference bridge between
pre-1975 first degree murder and second degree murder where no felony-murder
was involved. See, e.g., State v. Hyster, 504 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Mo. 1974).
145. The holding of State v. Baker, 636 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (first
degree murder is not a lesser included offense of capital murder), is not fully ad-
dressed here in terms of its affect on the relationship between those two homicides.
If Baker were dealt with fully, first degree murder would not provide an barrier for
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and second degree murder, the jury could properly convict of either murder
on the same facts.' 46 If the proper felony is involved, however, first degree
murder can provide an issue barrier which the jury could not break unless
some evidence in the record called into question the attempt or the commis-
sion of the felony.
Assume an accused undisputedly robbed a person and stabbed him one
hundred times. The case is submitted on capital murder, first degree mur-
der, and second degree murder. If the jury rejects capital murder, then to
reject first degree murder and still get to second degree murder the jurors
must find that no robbery occurred. This is a homicide case where a non-
homicide offense (a felony) constitutes an operative part of a presumptive
degree homicide. Is the jury allowed to disbelieve the undisputed evidence
as to this factual element of the homicide even though they would not be
allowed to do so outside the homicide scheme?"' The traditional answer is
no; second degree murder should not have been submitted because no evi-
dence disputed commission of the felony.
The MAI-CR answer is yes, because second degree murder is automat-
ically submissible under a capital murder charge. The jury determines the
defendant's mental culpability. What would be considered a roving com-
mission for a jury in a non-homicide case is sanctioned by the MAI-CR in a
homicide case.'
4 8
The situation for the automatic submission of manslaughter is no bet-
ter. Felony-murders quickly point up the flaw in the rule because they in-
volve a non-homicide offense, the felony, which bears on the defendant's
mental state. In State v. Martin, "' the defendant was charged with first de-
gree murder for a death caused by burns and smoke inhalation from a fire
the defendant allegedly set. The defendant denied setting the fire. First
the jury in a capital murder case before they could reach second degree murder
because it will be based on a separate charge. Baker is being ignored because the
interpretation given it by the court is unknown and because the structural integrity
of the proposed theoretical framework will not suffer in incorporating it.
146. This is the same as the difference between old conventional first degree
murder and conventional second degree murder. See, e.g., State v. Hyster, 504
S.W.2d 90 (Mo. 1974).
147. Missouri still uses the acquit/convict test in non-homicide cases. See Mo.
APPROVED INSTR.-CRIM. No. 17.00.5 (2d ed. 1979).
148. Convicting a defendant of second degree murder in this setting is different
than convicting of manslaughter when there is no evidence of provocation. Almost
every first degree felony-murder case will contain a prima facie case of second de-
gree murder. Therefore, a defendant could not complain that he was convicted of a
crime not supported by the evidence. This is different than being convicted of man-
slaughter on an undisputed case of second degree murder, where traditional con-
cepts would hold that the jury had impliedly acquitted the defendant of second
degree murder and that he was convicted of a crime not supported by the evidence.
Thus, in theory, he should win on appeal.
149. 602 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (history and problems of MAI-CR).
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degree murder and manslaughter were submitted to the jury. The jury con-
victed of manslaughter. The Martin court expressed frustration with the
automatic submission rule because the rule allowed the jury to convict a
person of killing another when it disbelieved that the defendant had com-
mitted the arson-the only causal link between him and the homicide.
150
The court reversed the conviction and discharged the defendant.' 5 1 If the
traditional evidentiary test had been used, manslaughter would not have
been submitted. The defendant would have been guilty of first degree mur-
der (arson) or not guilty of any homicide.' 52
The operation of the automatic submission rule between manslaughter
and second degree murder provides another example of the MAI-CR's the-
oretical weakness. According to the MAI-CR,"5 ' when a submissible case of
second degree murder exists there is evidence in the record to support a
manslaughter instruction.' 5 4 The legal foundation for this theory is
weak.' 55 Consider a practical setting. If the undisputed evidence shows
that A was discovered beating B over the head with a golf club and that B
died from such blows, A could be convicted of manslaughter' 5 6 despite the
absence of any evidence of provocation. It is the jury's prerogative to de-
cide the defendant's mental culpability. The MAI-CR has done away with
the presumption of murder with this position. It permits a jury to ignore
the universally operating legal inferences or presumptions which warrant a
verdict of guilty of murder (for example, a deadly weapon homicide) and to
reduce to manslaughter without any evidence inducing doubt as to the de-
fendant's premeditation or deliberation.1 57 This is not what the pre-MAI-
CR or early MAI-CR law permitted. 5
150. Id at 779.
151. Id at 780.
152. See, e.g. State v. Moore, 575 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); ef. State
v. McCall, 602 S.W.2d 702 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (discussed note 158 infra).
153. See State v. Stapleton, 518 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).
154. Id at 299. See also State v. Martin, 602 S.W.2d 772, 777 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980).
155. See State v. Ayers, 470 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Mo. 1971) (en banc).
156. See State v. Dixon, 563 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
157. Dion shows how Stapleton's position on a circumstantial evidence case op-
erates. See note 158 infra. The converse of Stapleton is closer to reality. In a circum-
stantial evidence case, presumably there would be no facts to reduce murder to
manslaughter, thus no manslaughter instruction should be given. Stapleton says that
since it is not known that there were not mitigating circumstances the jury should be
allowed to decide that issue. Ayers would hold only that a circumstantial evidence
case could result in a manslaughter instruction. However, Ayers requires that the
question whether mitigating evidence is present to be answered before permitting
such submission. Id at 538. See a/so State v. Patterson, 484 S.W.2d 278, 279-80
(Mo. 1972).
158. The majority of cases have followed the automatic submission rule for
manslaughter. See, e.g., State v. McCall, 602 S.W.2d 702, 707-08 (Mo. Ct. App.
[Vol. 48
30
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 4 [1983], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol48/iss4/3
MISSOURI HOMICIDES
How did the Missouri Supreme Court arrive at the justified by the
evidence test and its corollary, the automatic submission rule? The rules
are related to the court's alteration of the substantive definition of man-
slaughter. In State v. Stapleton, 159 the court made manslaughter the founda-
tion homicide which is necessarily present in every murder. This contortion
of long-settled substantive law transformed manslaughter into a homicide
essentially proven by establishing that a killing occurred. It is undisputable
that manslaughter is the lowest grade of punishable homicide, but the
MAI-CR position that manslaughter is the foundation homicide is an aber-
ration. Manslaughter has always involved the killing plus some evidence of
provocation. Close examination of a few cases will show how this mutation
occurred and how it lacks support.' 60
1980) (defendant charged with first degree murder (robbery) and convicted of man-
slaughter, first degree robbery, and armed criminal action for stabbing robbery vic-
tim; defendant argued the evidence showed he was guilty of first degree murder or
nothing at all; manslaughter conviction affirmed on basis that submissible case of
manslaughter present; conviction of first degree robbery affirmed; armed criminal
action verdict reversed); State v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 541, 576 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)
(defendant charged with capital murder and convicted of manslaughter; conviction
sustained because there was evidence in the record "sufficient to warrant a finding
that appellant caused the death of the victim by stabbing and cutting her" as set
out in the manslaughter instruction), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981); State v.
Carter, 585 S.W.2d 215, 216-18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (submissible case of second
degree murder made because defendant was discovered beating a jail employee
over the head with a mop wringer; manslaughter instruction held properly submit-
ted becaused it is "the jury's function to determine whether the killing was inten-
tional . . . and committed without provocation"; defendant convicted of second
degree murder); State v. Dixon, 563 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (defendant
charged with second degree murder and convicted of manslaughter on basis of
beating to death a fellow state penitentiary inmate in the head with a golf club,
judgment affirmed solely on basis of automatic submission rule without regard of
the fact no evidence of provocation was in the record); State v. Wood, 531 S.W.2d
543, 545-46 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (defendant charged with second degree murder
and convicted of manslaughter for homicide committed in 1972; defendant argued
that she was guilty as charged or that she should have been acquitted for justifiable
homicide; judgment affirmed solely on basis of MAI -CR automatic submission rule
and Stapleton).
159. 518 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).
160. See id at 300-01; State v. Ayers, 470 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Mo. 1971) (en banc);
State v. Williams, 442 S.W.2d 61, 64-65 (Mo. 1969) (en banc). It is not clear
whether Stapleton was based upon confusion or whether it was the product of a
preconceived notion to make instructing in homicide cases a no-fault process. The
legal fiction created by the MAI -CR, if believed, makes a submission to the jury of
almost every homicide matter of course. MAI -CR was designed to produce a sim-
ple, workable instruction scheme. See Foreword to MISSOURI BAR COMMITTEE
COMMENTS ON MISSOURI APPROVED CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS 3 (1974).
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2. The Transformation of Manslaughter
In State v. Stapleton, 161 the Missouri Supreme Court faced a circumstan-
tial evidence case involving whether a pistol in the victim's hands was dis-
charged due to the defendant's criminal act or whether the death was
accidental. The defendant claimed that the victim put the gun to her own
head in jest, and that the gun went off when he attempted to slap it away,
killing the victim. The jury convicted of manslaughter, rejecting second
degree murder. The defendant argued on appeal that no evidence of prov-
ocation was present and therefore he either was guilty of second degree
murder or should be acquitted. In affirming the manslaughter conviction,
the court declared that State v. Ayers162 required the trial court to submit
manslaughter in second degree murder cases even though there is no evi-
dence of provocation.'
63
The Stapleton court, relying on Ayers, announced the automatic submis-
sion rule with respect to manslaughter."6 If a submissible case of conven-
tional first or second degree murder is made, a manslaughter instruction
must be given to the jury. 65
Ayers was decided four years prior to Stapleton. In Ayers, the defendant
was convicted of manslaughter but did not request the instruction. In fact,
he argued on appeal that the evidence did not support such an instruction
and that he was either guilty of second degree murder or he should be ac-
quitted. The homicide was committed by one of two rivals for the love of
the defendant's wife. Evidence tended to prove that the defendant and the
victim had a struggle in the victim's second-floor apartment: a tenant be-
low testified that he heard the scuffling feet and then two shots. Defendant,
with a bloodied shirt, was then observed leaving the apartment. He turned
himself in and told the police he had shot the victim. As he left the police
station with officers, "a crying, hysterical woman was in the vicinity of the
front steps. Ayers said to her: I told her I was going to do it if she didn't
make up her mind between him and me who she wanted, me or the
boyfriend. '166
In upholding the manslaughter conviction, the court focused on the
duty to instruct on all questions of law and upon the concept that a defend-
ant's mental state is a question of fact to be left to the jury. The court held
161. 518 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).
162. 470 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. 1971) (en bane).
163. Stapleton, 518 S.W.2d at 299-300. Probably, the most concise statement in
Stapleton about Ayers is: "Affirmatively put, Ayers holds that when there is evidence
sufficient to submit second degree murder, there is automatically evidence sufficient
to submit manslaughter and that it is the function of the jury to decide whether the
defendant acted with premeditation or malice. Id
164. See id at 301 n.1.
165. The rule was to take effect on March 1, 1975.
166. 470 S.W.2d at 536.
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that State v. Williams '6 7 was erroneous to the extent it required proof of facts
tending to show want of premeditation and malice before an instruction on
manslaughter was warranted. 68 The Ayers court stated that when the de-
fendant was charged with second degree murder, the trial court could prop-
erly have instructed only as to second degree murder if it could be said as a
matter of law that there was no evidence for a verdict of guilty of
manslaughter. "'
At first, Ayers and Stapleton may have appeared consistent. Once the
ramifications of Stapleton's holding became more clear, however, the court
stated that aspects of Stapleton were being incorrectly attributed to Ayers. 17o
As the protests about Ayers in post-Stapleton cases are examined, doubt de-
velops as to whether Stapleton correctly analyzed Ayers. Stapleton overstated
the holding in Ayers and took a substantial misstep in Missouri homicide
law.
While Ayers is probably one of the most misunderstood cases in Mis-
souri homicide law, Williams is one of the most underrated. Although Ayers
criticizes Williams and overrules it to some extent, it also builds on it. The
court held its proof of facts requirement in Williams was erroneous and es-
sentially determined that the ultimate question on whether to submit a
manslaughter instruction is whether there was any evidence in the record
which could create doubt in a juror's mind as to the defendant's delibera-
tion, premeditation or malice aforethought.
Ayers is almost uniformly cited as eliminating the common law pre-
sumption of murder. 7 ' This is incorrect, and the cases relied upon in Ayers
bear this out. The cases recognize that the common law presumption is a
viable part of the law, but that it may be rebutted in particular cases due to
the evidence.' 72 The cases say that a judge may refuse to instruct on man-
167. 442 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1969) (en banc). Williams settled whether Missouri still
had common law manslaughter and provocation. The Williams proof of facts rule
was at least one step away from common law manslaughter.
168. 470 S.W.2d at 537.
169. Id at 538.
170. See, e.g., State v. Mudgett, 531 S.W.2d 275, 281 (Mo. 1975) (en banc) (Sta-
pleton, not Ayers, created the automatic submission rule), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 957
(1977); see also State v. King, 577 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (unanimous
court adopted the automatic submission rule).
171. See Instructing on Manslaughter-Eliminating the Presumption of Malice in Missouri
Homicide Cases, 38 Mo. L. REv. 105, 106 (1973); see also State v. Stapleton, 518
S.W.2d 292, 298 (Mo. 1975) (en banc); State v. Martin, 602 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1980).
172. In Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), the Court found as a matter
of law an entire absence of evidence upon which to rest a verdict of manslaughter.
Id at 64. The evidence showed a conspiracy by three sailors to kill the ship's sec-
ond mate. All three were convicted of murder. Cf. State v. Bradley, 361 Mo. 267,
269, 234 S.W.2d 556, 563 (1950) (murder during commission of robbery and failure
to instruct on manslaughter held not to be error); State v. Jones, 64 Mo. 391, 395
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slaughter only if there is no evidence which could cause doubt in a juror's
mind on the defendant's mental state.
173
Ayers was centrally concerned with articulating principles of post-Wil-
liams provocation.' 74 Ayers relieves the defendant from the Williams proof
of facts burden of constructing a scenario of provocation or heat of passion
to prove he was guilty of only manslaughter.1 75 Ayers also made it the trial
judge's duty under section 546.070 to determine if the question of law arose
and, if so, to instruct upon it.
1 76
Ayers did not destroy the traditional Missouri presumption of second
degree murder. It held only that if no doubt-inducing evidence exists in the
record, manslaughter should not be instructed upon. 177 If the case had de-
stroyed the presumption of murder, it would have stated that manslaughter
would be properly submissible in every instance where a second degree
muder case was made.' 78 It is obvious from Ayers and from the opinions
following it that this is not what the court held; rather, under Ayers, tradi-
tional ideas of negating malice and premeditation by fear, anger, or agita-
tion still operated but were no longer restricted by the rigid demands of
proof in common law manslaughter. 179 Ayers recognized that the abandon-
(1877) (no error to refuse to instruct on manslaughter on evidence that gang of men
came to deceased's home, took him out and shot him). The prima facie cases of
murder in Bradley and Jones were not conclusive presumptions; the jury was author-
ized to convict of the crime which the evidence supported or to acquit. Bradley, 361
Mo. at 279, 234 S.W.2d at 563;Jones, 64 Mo. at 395. See Part III supra.
173. See note 172 supra.
174. The defendant did not attempt to prove he was provoked. He was con-
victed of manslaughter and was trying to assert an implied acquittal of second de-
gree murder and to assert that no evidence supported the manslaughter conviction.
The focus of Ayers was Missouri's new non-common law manslaughter.
175. See note 165 supra.
176. 470 S.W.2d at 538.
177. This evidence was present in Ayers, as several opinions have observed. See,
e.g., State v. Sturdivan, 497 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Mo. 1973).
178. Ayers did not say this; moreover the case is clearly limited to its facts. 470
S.W.2d at 538.
179. This is shown by the continued reliance on State v. Clough, 327 Mo. 700,
38 S.W.2d 36 (1931):
The authorities are fairly harmonious in holding that, in order for a
homicide to be reduced from murder to manslaughter, there must be a
sudden unexpected assault, encounter, or provocation tending to excite
the passion beyond control. It is not the assault or the provocation alone
that reduces the grade of the crime, but it is the sudden happening or
occurrence of the provocation so as to render the mind incapable of reflec-
tion and obscure the reason so that the elements of malice and delibera-
tion necessary to constitute murder are absent, and therefore the crime is
not murder, but manslaughter.
Id at 705, 38 S.W.2d at 38. The Clough test has been employed before and after
Ayers. See, e.g., State v. Mudgett, 531 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Mo. 1975) (en banc), cert.
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ment of common law manslaughter accomplished in Williams gave rise to
an expanded concept of provocation, permitting more juries to determine
from proper doubt-inducing evidence whether the accused had malice and
premeditation when he committed the intentional act which caused the vic-
tim's death. Moreover, the Ayers test is no more difficult to apply than any
other legal test for what constitutes a submissible case. Many cases will lack
evidence warranting a manslaughter instruction.'
8 0
If there is a legitimately troublesome or a misleading statement in
Ayers, it is where the opinion seems to set out the homicides in a hierarchy,
with manslaughter being described as an intentional killing and with sec-
ond degree murder and first degree murder being described as manslaugh-
ter plus some mental element."' When this paragraph from Ayers is read as
an entity, it accurately states the law at that time-an intentional killing
can be manslaughter if it is without malice, premeditation, or deliberation.
The observation is incorrect, however, if it was intended to convey the con-
cept that every intentional killing is manslaughter and might be murder
upon proof of additional facts. 
18 2
Manslaughter is statutorily defined as a killing that is not murder and
not excusable or justifiable homicide.183 Thus, the question is how to get
from a prima facie case of murder to manslaughter. Under Ayers, this in-
volves some doubt-inducing evidence consisting of anger, fear or agitation.
Given that Ayers requires some of this evidence, the studied paragraph can-
not mean that the presumption of murder no longer existed. At most it
recognized that the common law concept of provocation-an inflexible and
narrow mechanism to escape the presumption of malice on a prima facie
case of murder-died with common law manslaughter.
Stapleton interpreted Ayers as holding that manslauglhter is present in
every prima facie second degree murder case.' 8 4 Stapleton's ultimate accom-
plishment was to equate the relationship between second degree murder
and manslaughter with the permissible inference bridge between conven-
tional first degree murder and conventional second degree murder.'8 5 To
accomplish this, Stapleton relied on Ayers and State v. Johnson. 186 In Johnson,
the trial court was reversed for failing to instruct on second degree murder
denied, 426 U.S. 910 (1976); State v. Jackson, 496 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. 1973); State v.
Ginnings, 466 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Mo. 1971).
180. See, e.g., State v. Bradley, 361 Mo. 267, 234 S.W.2d 556 (1950); State v.
Jones, 64 Mo. 391 (1877); see also State v. Sturdivan, 497 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Mo.
1973).
181. 470 S.W.2d at 537-38.
182. See State v. Gore, 292 Mo. 173, 237 S.W. 993 (1922).
183. See Parts II & III supra.
184. 518 S.W.2d 292, 300 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).
185. This served to make manslaughter, rather than second degree murder, the
pivotal homicide in the Missouri scheme. See Part III supra.
186. 505 S.W.2d 94 (Mo. 1974).
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when a circumstantial evidence case of conventional first degree murder
existed.18 7 Stapleton liberally quotedJohnson on the permissible inference of
the element of deliberation from the evidence in the case and then drew a
direct parallel between how a jury can find the element of "deliberation"
for first degree murder and how it can find the malice and premeditation
necessary for second degree murder.1 8 The court held that manslaughter
was a foundation homicide, a homicide from which the prosecutor could
attempt to convince the jury that the facts and circumstances showed the
defendant had the requisite mental state for second degree murder.' 8 9
Stapleton truly abolished the presumption of second degree murder. As
observed earlier, though, Stapleton cannot be said to have properly relied on
Ayers for this result. Ayers cut the ties to common law manslaughter and
only required a trial judge to determine whether as a matter of law a juror
could find from the evidence in the record that the defendant was of such
an excited or impassioned state of mind that he did not possess the malice
and premeditation necessary for murder. Stapleton was an extension of
Ayers' 90 which misconceived the substantive law of manslaughter and sec-
ond degree murder as Ayers declared it.
The manner in which Stapleton attempts to distinguish between second
degree murder and manslaughter, ze., that the former requires the intent to
kill and the latter does not, is unworkable for a jury. It puts the ultimate
question of the required mens rea to the jury without guidance. The jury
cannot rely upon a presumption of malice arising from an intentional kill-
ing."9 It seems that in Stapleton the court got caught on the Ayers language
187. Id at 95-96.
188. 518 S.W.2d at 300.
189. The Stapleton court observed:
Johnson and the instant case are circumstantial evidence cases. The
principal distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter is
that the former requires a finding of intent to kill (premeditation and mal-
ice aforethought). If the accused intended to kill the deceased, then he is
guilty of murder in the second degree (unless provocation prevents con-
viction of murder in the second degree). The intent to kill may be inferred
from the circumstances. InJohnson the only evidence of deliberation was
circumstantial. Here, the only evidence of intent to kill is circumstantial.
The evidence authorized an inference of intent to kill but did not compel
such a finding. If the jury did not find intent to kill, then the defendant
could still be guilty of manslaughter because it does not require that
element.
518 S.W.2d at 300-301.
190. See Mo. APPROVED INSTR.-CRIM. No. 6.02 note 4(c)(2) (1974). However,
Stapleton interpreted Ayers as plainly requiring creation of the automatic submission
rule.
191. Stapleton and MAI-CR request that the jury pass on the issue of man-
slaughter in every prima facie conventional second degree murder case by asking
whether the accused had the intent to kill and whether the intent to kill was pro-
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that a felonious, intentional killing is only manslaughter unless malice and
premeditation are present (which would be second degree murder) or unless
deliberation is present (which would be first degree murder).' 9 2 If so, the
Stapleton court incorrectly interpreted this language in Ayers to mean that
the presumption of second degree murder was gone. Earlier cases made
statements nearly identical to that in Ayers and were not seen as having this
effect.' 9 3 Ayers merely underscores that the State has the burden of proof on
the issue of a defendant's guilt of any punishable homicide. When a homi-
cide is committed and the corpus delicti proven, the presumption of malice
and premeditation arises. Ayers did not alter this.
Manslaughter can be a homicide which results from an intentional act.
Such a killing is manslaughter when provocation negates the existence of
malice. Thus, society recognizes certain fact patterns which show that the
voked. No evidence of provocation is required. IfA walks calmly into an ice cream
parlor and shoots B whose back is turned, in the head five times, causing death, the
jurors could on the basis of ten witnesses' uncontradicted testimony find that A
committed manslaughter, rather than second degree murder, due to provocation.
The problem is that the Stapleton request requires a jury to decide, without any
guidance, one of the most difficult questions of criminal law: did the actor possess
the malice required for murder? Stapleton must be abandoned and Missouri must
return to the common law concept that a homicidal act committed intentionally
raises a presumption of malice. If the jury decides the act was intentional, then
malice is present. Then the jury may consider whether provocation evidence
reduces the murder to manslaughter. If not, the jury should convict of at least
second degree murder or acquit if it finds that the defendant did not commit the act
intentionally or with culpable negligence.
192. Ayers, 470 S.W.2d at 537-38.
193. See State v. Gore, 292 Mo. 173, 237 S.W. 993 (1922). The court dealt with
the alleged failure to properly define manslaughter, i.e., terms like "heat of passion"
and "lawful provocation":
All reference to manslaughter at the common law was omitted in the
act of 1919. Every killing of a human being is now manslaughter unless
done deliberately, premeditatedly, or maliciously, or under circumstances
found by the jury to be justifiable or excusable. This statutory definition
does away with heat of passion as a necessary element of the crime, and
such element need no longer be included in an instruction defining the
facts necessary for the jury to find in order to return a verdict of guilty of
manslaughter.
Id at 187-88, 237 S.W.at 996-97 (emphasis added). The defendant was convicted of
manslaughter and there was evidence to support provocation. Id at 180, 237 S.W.
at 994. The every killing statement is wrong to the extent it was intended to make
manslaughter the pivotal homicide. Since 1919, the statutes have defined man-
slaughter as a homicide which is not murder; manslaughter is reached by deciding
that murder was not committed. This could be said only if the malice which arises
from most any and all homicides committed by an intentional act is somehow ne-
gated. Evidence of non-common law provocation is needed to negate it.
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actor was incensed into uncontrollable fear or anger. 9 4 An evidentiary ba-
sis for provocation always has been required, and Ayers did not change this.
By contrast, Stapleton and the MAI-CR allow the jury to find sufficient
provocation without any evidence of it.'9 5 If Stapleton's statements about
the distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter were truly
followed, provocation would play no part in a jury's choice between the
homocides. The jury should merely be asked whether it believes beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused had the intent to kill.
1 96
Another aspect of Stapleton which illustrates its misinterpretation of
Ayers is the significance it places on the fact that it was a circumstantial
evidence case.'9 7 This seems to show that the Stapleton court believed that
the Ayers' evidence test meant that where there was no direct testimony as
to how the killing occurred, it could not be said as a matter of law that no
provocation was involved. Stapleton articulates that a circumstantial evi-
dence case, more than any other, warrants submission of manslaughter to
the jury. Ayers does not support this proposition because it required evi-
dence of provocation. If the evidence of the killing was circumstantial,
there would probably be no evidence of anger, fear or agitation, and under
194. See State v. Gadwood, 342 Mo. 466, 116 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 1937).
195. See MISSOURI APPROVED INSTR.-CRIM. No. 15.14 (2d ed. 1979) (in conven-
tional second degree murder jury must decide whether the defendant was provoked
before it can convict of second degree murder). This instruction
does not require the state to produce direct or eye-witness evidence that
the defendant acted without provocation. The facts submitted . . . may
be inferred by the jury from proven facts and circumstances. Once a
prima facie case of conventional second degree murder is made out, it
will be the jury's function to determine whether or not the killing was
intentional, State v. Bolden, 494 S.W.2d 61, 65 (Mo. 1973), and committed
without provocation. Stater. Stapleton, 518 S.W.2d 292, 299-300 (Mo. banc
1975).
Id note 3.
196. The Stapleton delineation between second degree murder and manslaughter
allows a conviction for manslaughter if the jury decides that the intent to kill was
not present. Thus, one who had no intent to kill or even any intent to commit the
act which resulted in death could be convicted of manslaughter. An unintentional
act resulting in death could support a second degree murder conviction. See, e.g.,
State v. Guyton, 635 S.W.2d 353, 359 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) ("Manslaughter is a
residuary homicide offense; an unintentional killing of another which did not occur
in the commission of a dangerous felony."). Stapleton and MAI -CR seem to insure
that a defendant is convicted of some crime. The results are unsatisfactory because
they allow the jury to acquit a defendant of second degree murder where the evi-
dence is uncontradicted, and convict of manslaughter on evidence that the defend-
ant is either guilty of second degree murder or is innocent. In Stapleton, for example,
the evidence supported second degree murder or accidental shooting (ruling out the
unlikely conclusion that the defendant was convicted of culpable negligence
manslaughter).
197. See note 189 and accompanying text supra.
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Ayers a trial judge could properly say that as a matter of law no juror could
possibly find provocation.1 98
V. TIME FOR A CHANGE
Despite the flaws of MAI-CR's operative theories, the Missouri
Supreme Court has reaffirmed its position that the traditional ac-
quit/convict evidentiary test does not apply to homicide cases.' 9 9 More-
over, the court's view of manslaughter shows no sign of changing. Recently
the Missouri General Assembly enacted a comprehensive revision of the
homicide scheme. 2" This new legislation merits examination because of
the bearing it will have on the future of this area of criminal law in
Missouri.
A. The New Homicides
The most grievous homicide in the new scheme is first degree murder.
It replaces capital murder as the Missouri homicide punishable by death.2" 1
First degree murder is committed if one "knowingly causes the death of
another person after deliberation upon the matter."20 2 This homicide is a
true facts and circumstances murder (just as capital murder was) because it
has no felony-murder facet. Both "knowingly" and "deliberation" are stat-
utorily defined.2" 3 The former has a traditional meaning under Missouri
law.20 4 So also does the definition of deliberation, which is the "cool reflec-
tion for any length of time no matter how brief."' 5 This is substantially
198. The Ayers court was concerned with the evidence in the record. To apply
the test as Stapleton does essentially requires the State to prove that there was no
provocation before a manslaughter instruction can be refused. This would be an
impossible burden to carry in a circumstantial evidence case. It also requires that
the jury speculate as to how the homicide may have occurred. Ayers explicitly re-
quired evidence of provocation and thus would not have warranted Stapleton's
conclusion.
199. See State v. Olson, 636 S.W.2d 318 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
200. Act of June 15, 1983, 82d Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. S.B. No. 276, 1983
Mo. Legis. Serv. 134 (West) (to be codified in scattered sections of Mo. REV.
STAT.). The new law repeals, effective July 1, 1984, many of the sections previously
discussed: Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 546.070, 562.076, 565.001, .003, .004, .008, .014,
.016, .021, .026, .031, .050, .060 (1978); id §§ 556.061, .005, .006, .012, 577.005
(Supp. 1982). 1983 Mo. Legis. Serv. at 134, 154.
201. Capital murder is replaced with first degree murder in all the death penalty
provisions. See, e.g., id at 147-48 (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.032).
202. Id. at 143 (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.020).
203. For the definition of knowingly, see Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.016 (1978). De-
liberation is now defined in 1983 Mo. Legis. Serv. 139-40 (West) (to be codified at
Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.002(3)).
204. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.016.3 (1978); note 61 supra.
205. 1983 Mo. Legis. Serv. 139 (West) (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.002(3)); note 61 supra.
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consistent with Missouri's prior definition of this term.2" 6 There seems to be
a merging of the previous terms or concepts of premeditation and delibera-
tion because of the "for any length of time no matter how brief" language.
This idea comes from the now discarded "premeditation. '"2' 7 It is difficult
to say whether this blending is a step down in required mental culpability
or is a similar, more straight forward concept of deliberation.
Second degree murder is now committed when a person: (1) know-
ingly or with the purpose of causing serious physical injury to another per-
son, causes the death of another person, 20 8 or (2) recklessly causes the death
of another under "circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life."'209 Recklessness and indifference can be proven by the
attempt or commission of the felony, but is not limited to such a method.2 10
The statute has an operative felony-murder rule that includes every fel-
ony.2 11 Second degree felony-murder now includes felonies formerly con-
tained in the first degree murder statute. Thus, proof of the attempt or
commission of any felony should prove the requisite mental state for second
degree murder.
The statute also has a conventional murder side, which does not re-
quire the same culpable mental state as the felony-murder side. The reck-
lessness and indifference used for second degree felony-murder appears to
be a lesser mental state21 2 than "knowingly" for conventional second degree
murder and seems to be an effort to pull the felony-murder rule within the
mental culpability perimeters of the criminal code.213
The new manslaughter statute closely resembles the traditional com-
mon law definition of manslaughter but appears to be tempered by modern
constitutional concerns. Manslaughter is a homicide that would be conven-
tional second degree murder 21 4 except that the actor was under the influ-
206. See note 61 supra.
207. Premeditation means that the defendant has thought of the act for any
length of time before acting. State v. Strickland, 609 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Mo. 1980);
State v. Weiners, 66 Mo. 13, 25 (1877).
208. 1983 Mo. Legis. Serv. 142 (West) (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.021.1 (1)).
209. Id (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.021.1(2)).
210. Under new § 565.021.1(2), the felony-murder rule is not the only way to
establish recklessness and indifference.
211. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.003 (1978) (felony-murder rule operates
only for rape, arson, burglarly, robbery, and kidnapping).
212. Id § 562.021.3.
213. New § 562.021 shows that at least a reckless state of mind is required unless
the statute specifically dispenses with a requisite mental culpability.
214. This is the second degree murder in new § 565.012.1(1) but not in new
§ 565.021.1(2). However, this does not mean that voluntary manslaughter could
never be submitted as a lesser included offense of a second degree felony-murder.
There would have to be evidence to allow the jury to find that the homicide was not
a felony-murder and that there was adequate provocation.
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ence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause.215 The defendant has
the burden of "injecting the issue" of this mitigating influence.2 16 There
must be evidence to support the provocation issue,217 but the trier of fact
must find in favor of the defendant if it has any reasonable doubt on this
issue.21" Thus, the new statute avoids the pitfall of putting the burden of
proof on the defendant.2 1 9 This statute resembles the rule announced in
State v. Ayers. 
220
The defendant has the burden of injecting the issue of provocation, but
he is not specifically responsible to produce the evidence.221 Thus merely
requesting a manslaughter instruction should satisfy his affirmative duty
under the statute. The trial court has a statutory duty,2 22 however, to de-
termine whether the evidence supports a manslaughter instruction. Ayers
could be used to analyze this question-can it be said as a matter of law
that no evidence of provocation exists in the record? If not, the manslaugh-
ter instruction should be given and the jury decides whether the evidence
proves adequate provocation. If the jurors have reasonable doubt whether
provocation caused the accused to commit the homicide, then manslaugh-
ter is the homicide that has been committed. If the evidence is clearly not
supportive of any provocation, then the instruction should not be given.
22 3
By articulating a test for submitting the instruction, this new format goes
one step further than Ayers because it states that a juror's reasonable doubt
on the provocation issue must be resolved in favor of the defendant.2
B. Lesser Included Offenses and Instructing Down
The new statute qualifies the trial court's long standing duty to in-
struct the jury in writing upon all questions of law arising in a case.2 2 5
215. 1983 Mo. Legis. Serv. 144 (West) (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT.§ 565.023.1).
216. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 556.051, .061(2) (1978).
217. Id § 556.051.
218. Id § 556.051(2).
219. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703-04 (1975) (placing burden on
defendant is unconstitutional).
220. 470 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. 1971) (en banc).
221. Merely because evidence must be in the record does not mean the burden
of proof is on the defendant. In common law manslaughter, the defendant had the
burden of convincing the jury that the provocation caused him to kill, whereas here
the jury's reasonable doubt on the issue means that they must find in the defend-
ant's favor.
222. 1983 Mo. Legis. Serv. 135 (West) (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT.§ 546.070(4)).
223. This is the converse of Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.051(1) (1978).
224. Id § 556.051. Ayers embodied the reasonable doubt concept employed in
the new statute.
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Under the new homicide act, no instruction on a lesser included offense
shall be submitted unless one of the parties requests it.
226
Missouri Revised Statutes section 556.046227 "shall be used for the pur-
pose of consideration of lesser offenses by the trier of all homicide cases."
2 28
Therefore, the acquit/convict test of section 556.046 governs instructing
down for the homicides.229 A trial court need not instruct a jury upon a
lesser included offense unless there is evidence to support conviction of a
lesser and acquittal of the greater.
The new scheme contains two exceptions to this rule. First, the evi-
dence test cannot be used to thwart a party's affirmative duty to request an
instruction. 2" This exception shows that section 556.046 requires the trial
court to instruct down if the evidentiary requirement therein is met.
23 1
The second exception in Missouri Revised Statutes section 565.025.1232
states that section 556.046 and section 565.025 are to be disregarded in cases
with second degree murder charges. There, the trier of fact shall consider
both conventional second degree murder and second degree felony-murder
if the evidence supports them.233 Although it is not clear whether this ex-
ception is intended to alter the evidentiary test where the new "only if re-
quested" instruction rule functions, it has some obvious and reasonable
ramifications. Most importantly, it will keep felony-murder rule homicide
alive in Missouri.
The statute says only that a charge of second degree murder can serve
as a foundation for instructions on both conventional and felony-murder.
2 34
As a corollary, the phrase "supported by the evidence" in section 565.021.3
must be the "substantial evidence" test discussed earlier.235 This is true
because rather than being a lesser included offense situation, it deals with
the conventional and felony-murder facets of one homicide. Thus, on a
charge of second degree murder, whether conventional or felony murder,
the jury could consider a conventional second degree murder instruction
226. Id at 145 (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.025.3).
227. (1978).
228. 1983 Mo. Legis. Serv. 145 (West) (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.025.1).
229. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
230. 1983 Mo. Legis. Serv. 145 (West) (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.025.3).
231. This shows a blurring of the concepts of when an offense is a lesser included
offense and when to instruct down. It also seems to show that § 556.046 is still
being interpreted to put an instructing duty upon a trial court. See Part IV supra.
232. This refers to § 565.021.3. The reference in this section to § 565.025 is pre-
sumably to the no instruction unless requested rule in § 565.025.3.
233. 1983 Mo. Legis. Serv. 144 (West) (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.021.3).
234. The mental culpability for these two homicides is different.
235. See note 108 supra. Both forms of second degree murder are to be consid-
ered only if warranted by the evidence.
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and, if the evidence satisfied the felony-murder rule, they could also con-
sider a second degree felony-murder instruction. To employ the ac-
quit/convict test here would ignore the legislature's intent to make second
degree murder a homicide possessing a felony-murder rule and its desire to
permit a jury to consider both aspects of this homicide in determining a
defendant's guilt or innocence.
In an apparent effort to simplify the determination of lesser included
offenses, the new homicide statute also contains a list of lesser degree of-
fenses.23 6 The relationship between this designation and section 556.046.1,
which sets out the three methods by which one offense can be a lesser in-
cluded offense of another, is not clear. Perhaps the word "included" is
omitted because some lesser offenses are not necessarily included within the
greater offense as they were at common law.23 7 It also seems that the "lesser
degree" language misses the mark if it is an attempt to apply the "specifi-
cally denominated lesser" test in section 556.046.1(2). In the purest form,
"speficially denominated lessers" should involve a hierarchy of number de-
grees of an offense of the same name, like first and second degree murder.
238
The "lesser degree offense" list in the new statute, however, provides notice
of what lesser offenses one could be convicted of on the basis of a charge of
the greater offense. 239 The new statute makes no attempt to set out what
we have termed elements lessers, but it does state that section 556.046 "shall
be used for . . . consideration of lesser offenses . . . in all homicide
cases.
'240
Second degree murder committed knowingly or under the serious
physical injury aspect of the definition would qualify as an elements lesser
of first degree murder.24 1 Second degree felony-murder also would qualify
236. 1983 Mo. Legis. Serv. 145 (West) (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.025.2).
237. If so, then "included" should have been taken out of Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 556.046 (1978).
238. See note 103 supra.
239. "Denominated" is flexible enough to include "designated." For instance,
the lesser included offense list in 1983 Mo. Legis. Serv. 145 (West) (to be codified at
Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.025.2) designates offenses as lesser offenses. Mo. REV. STAT.
Section 556.046.1 (1978) sets out three ways an offense can be a lesser included
offense, but id § 565.025.1 does not state that it controls over § 556.046.1. If strictly
read, the lesser included offense list seems to be without foundation in the Code as
establishing lesser included offenses. This is academic because § 556.046 will make
lesser included offenses (elements lessers) of all those listed in § 565.025.2 though
not necessarily for the reasons given there. The list cannot be said to exclude the
operation of § 556.046.1.
240. 1983 Mo. Legis. Serv. 145 (West) (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.025.1).
241. Knowingly must be a lesser grade of mental culpability than deliberation.
The distinction separated second degree murder from capital murder and old first
degree murder. See Part III supra.
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as an elements lesser because the felony-murder is not an element of second
degree murder but merely a method of proof. The relationship between
conventional first and second degree murder embodies the permissible in-
ference bridge that existed between old first degree murder and second de-
gree murder and, more recently, between capital murder and conventional
second degree murder. Second degree murder is also a specifically denomi-
nated lesser of first degree murder. Finally, as set out in section
565.025.2(1) (a), second degree murder is also a lesser degree offense of first
degree murder.
The statute states that voluntary manslaughter 42 is also a lesser degree
offense of first degree murder. The specifically denominated lesser test in
section 556.046 does not warrant this conclusion. Although not a literal
reading of that test, the statute does provide sufficient notice of the lesser
offenses of the charged offense. This is unnecessary though, because where
manslaughter really qualifies as a proper lesser included offense is an ele-
ments lesser of first degree murder. This is so because manslaughter is de-
fined as a homicide that, but for provocation, would be second degree
murder.2 43 This definition of manslaughter does not mean that it is limited
only to second degree murder cases; the use of second degree murder in
manslaughter's definition is only a point of reference.244 Moreover, the re-
quirement of sudden passion is not an element of manslaughter, but rather
a circumstance allowing a logical distinction between manslaughter and
murder. There must be some evidence of provocation to allow a defendant
to inject the issue.245
The new statute also states that involuntary manslaughter 246 is a lesser
degree offense of first degree murder.24 7 An instruction on this type of man-
slaughter should not be submitted unless the murder is a conventional mur-
der or a felony-murder where the evidence casts doubt upon commission of
the felony.
Voluntary manslaughter is an elements lesser of second degree murder
because it would be second degree murder but for the existence of sudden
passion arising from adequate cause.24 8 It does not literally qualify as a
specifically denominated lesser, but the new statute gives proper notice that
it is a lesser offense with its lesser degree offense language. This is unneces-
sary, however, since an offense need only qualify under one of the tests in
242. See 1983 Mo. Legis. Serv. 144 (West) (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.023.1(1)).
243. Id (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.023).
244. This is a slight modification of the traditional manslaughter definition--a
homicide which but for provocation would be murder.
245. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.051(1) (1978).
246. 1983 Mo. Legis. Serv. 144 (West) (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.024.1(1)).
247. Id at 145 (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.025.2(1)(c)).
248. Id at 144 (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.023).
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section 556.046 to be a proper lesser included offense. There must be evi-
dence of provocation before an instruction on voluntary manslaughter is
submitted.
Involuntary manslaughter2 49 is an elements lesser of second degree
murder under section 565.021.1(2) because it is a homicide committed reck-
lessly, and that form of second degree murder requires a finding of reckless-
ness and extreme indifference to the value of human life. Because these two
components of the requisite second degree mental state are proven by the
felony-murder rule,2 50 it seems that instructing down to involuntary man-
slaughter25 1 would be proper only in two situations. The first would be a
felony-murder fact pattern where the acquit/convict test is satisfied as to
the commission or attempt of the felony. The second situation involves a
conventional second degree murder that does not involve a felony-murder
fact pattern and which is arguably committed recklessly. This seems to fol-
low from the open-ended character of section 565.021.1(2), which describes
second degree felony-murder.2 52 It states that the required recklessness and
extreme indifference to human life are established by the felony murder
rule but other evidence can also show it.
C. Thoughts On The New Scheme
Second degree murder is the pivotal homicide due to its all-encompass-
ing felony-murder subframe. Formerly, an attempt or commission of a fel-
ony specified in the first degree murder statute would allow bypassing
second degree murder in building a case, but now all felonies are on equal
footing. It is hard to conceive of a homicide being committed when a fel-
ony is not. Thus, the mandatory consideration rule in section 565.021.3
may force felony-murder into every case possible. Therefore, the distinction
between second degree murder and manslaughter should be a brighter line.
If the felony-murder rule is satisfied then before any type of manslaughter
can be instructed upon, there must be evidence contrary to the attempt or
commission of that felony. This should limit involuntary manslaughter in-
structions to those traditional involuntary manslaughter fact patterns which
bear evidentiary earmarks of a homicide less grievous than second degree
murder.25 3 Thus, if it is an undisputed felony-murder, no involuntary man-
slaughter instruction can be given; if the felony is proven, the recklessness
and extreme indifference required for second degree murder are established.
249. Id (to be codified at Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.024.1(1)).
250. Proof of the felony establishes these two components of the requisite mental
state.
251. 1983 Mo. Legis. Serv. 144 (West) (to be codified at Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 565.024).
252. Id at 143 (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.021.1(2)) (recklessness
and indifference can be established by proof other than the attempt or commission
of felonies).
253. See, e.g., State v. Yates, 301 Mo. 255, 271-72, 256 S.W. 809, 814 (1923).
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Defendants will not doubt argue that involuntary manslaughter is an ele-
ments lesser of a reckless and indifferent second degree murder and there-
fore they are entitled to a manslaughter instruction.
The traditional rules discussed earlier should be employed in conven-
tional second degree murder to create the presumption of a homicide com-
mitted knowingly or with the purpose of causing serious physical injury.
The statute seems to be geared for that approach with its "serious physical
injury" language. Like its felony-murder complement, this phrase seems to
include every possible physical injury fact pattern for a homicide. There-
fore, even in a conventional second degree murder case the jury should con-
vict of second degree murder if the act was intentional. Of course, the
defendant can inject the issue of voluntary manslaughter, but there must be
evidence of influence of sudden passion arising from adequate provoca-
tion.25 4 As for involuntary manslaughter,2 55 the defendant could argue
that the homicide was committed recklessly, but he should have to point to
evidence warranting a conviction thereof anud acquittal of second degree
murder. As a practical matter, the redefinition of second degree murder
and involuntary manslaughter should make a second degree murder convic-
tion more likely than under the old definitions, but overall they seem consis-
tent with prior law.
25 6
The relationship between first degree murder and second degree mur-
der is such that the State will be asking the jury to believe that the homicide
was committed with more than a knowing or reckless and indifferent state
of mind. This is a true permissible inference because there is no factual
element substitute for the first degree murder mental state of deliberation.
Thus, even though a defendant is charged with first degree murder there
will always be an instruction on second degree murder, but not necessarily
on first degree murder. If there is a validly operating automatic submission
rule situation in this new homicide scheme, this is certainly it.
VI. CONCLUSION
Two problems exist with the present homicide scheme. First, the
homicides are not organized in an order of descending gravity. Second, the
M1issouri Supreme Court's present approach in dealing with the homicides
as substantive offenses and its position on the interrelationship of the homi-
cides as exemplified by the MAI-CR presents difficulties.
The 1975 homicide scheme over-extended a good format. The 1835
254. 1983 Mo. Legis. Serv. 144 (West) (to be codified at'Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.023.1(1)).
255. Id. (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.024.1).
256. E.g., State v. Yates, 301 Mo. 255, 271-72, 256 S.W. 809. 814 (1923) (shoot-
ing into a room not intending to hit anyone would be involuntary manslaughter).
The new statute could create problems for juries because of its fine line between
second degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. At the least, "extreme indif-
ference" should be defined.
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homicide scheme basically consisted of common law murder (second degree
murder) and a murder involving deliberation (first degree murder). The
1975 scheme attempted to stretch this one step further by using half of
"old" first degree murder to serve as capital murder. As a result, the death
penalty was still imposed for a deliberate murder, just as under the pre-1975
murder scheme. Too much concern, however, was given to designing a con-
stitutional capital murder statute, and the solid performance of the old
scheme was taken for granted. Splitting old first degree murder into capital
murder and first degree murder created problems in the scheme.
The new homicide format provides an opportunity to learn from these
past errors. It attempts to reinstate, as far as permissible, the traditional
relationship between murder and manslaughter as well as to return to the
acquit/convict evidentiary test for instructing down. Its two-murder for-
mat is a substantial improvement over its stilted, three-murder predecessor.
The new legislation also demands revision of MAI-CR. The court
needs to re-examine its views on the interrelationship of the homicides and
instructing down in homicide cases. The present theoretical foundations of
MAI-CR are weak. Revision of MAI-CR and proper application of the
new homicide scheme could help eliminate the confusion and misunder-
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